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2(Transcription began when meeting was ½
hour in progress)
MR. KEALY: But there was general unanimity
of opinion that the red flag was used and was important.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Did the importance
run, though, Bill, to the inadequacies of the other
disclosures of contingencies?
MR. KEALY: Yes and no. There are all kinds
of second and third derivatives here. One of the
conversations went along these lines:
"Clearly, I've got to read the whole
report, not just the annual report, the 10-K's and 10-Q's, 
and everything that's coming out and talk to everybody
under the moon, but I've got to talk to somebody someplace,
and the place I start is: Is there a clean bill of health
here or is there something I want to delve into first?"
Secondly, there is an unstated, perhaps,
but there is an assumption that the auditor is privy to
individuals, to information which is never available to
the public observer of financial matters.
I mean, we simply don't have access to the
numbers of people within an organization, and the records
documentation of litigation, or whatever might be the
contingency. You do. 
3And when it's known by the preparer of 
that information that the auditor may exercise his right 
to indicate some qualifier, there is a presumption, again
maybe wrong, but there is a presumption that there will
be more disclosure or that the disclosure will be more
specific or that the disclosure will be more prominently
placed in the financials and not weaved somewhere into
the background.
If you eliminate that implied or express
threat or option — let's deescalate, let's call it the
option of the auditor, to put a subjective opinion in
a report, if that's removed in some subtle way, the
power shift between the auditor, as the representative
of the rightness and the correctness of the accounting,
and so on, and the users shifts in favor of the preparer,
but maybe there will be less disclosure, maybe the
disclosure will be more obtuse, obscure, and that may
be the wrong presumption to reach, but it clearly is
the presumption that exists, at least in the universe
that I'm interactive with.
I have one question I should have asked
before I went off on this tirade: It's not clear to me -
4and I did read all the materials -- because of my
personal background, it's not clear to me whether we're
talking of the elimination of the "Subject To" and not
"Except For" and disclaimers and other methods of
qualifying statements.
Are we talking about no qualifiers or
are we talking about one particular type of qualifier
being changed?
MR. MULLARKEY: That's an excellent
question, yes. The proposal is to eliminate the "Subject
To" qualification and any other way or expressing the
same item.
In other words, we are not touching any
other of our reporting options except for what would be
used if the disclosure was inadequate in a particular case,
but it is the elimination of the "Subject To" as it
relates to the redundancy of the expression.
Now, the one part that may be confusing
in the proposal is the fact that there are two other
ways that an auditor can deal with an uncertainty under
our current reporting standards.
One is to disclaim for an uncertainty, and
5the other is to emphasize an uncertainty, but not affect
the opinion. And the proposal we have would eliminate
those two options as it relates to an uncertainty, and
all the rest of our reporting literature remains as it is.
Is that responsive?
MR. KEALY: That's responsive.
Perhaps you have this kind of information
as to how many "Subject To" qualifications there are?
Is it quite a few, or fewer than "Except For's" or other
types of disclaimers?
Is it the predominant form auditor
qualification statement?
MR. MULLARKEY: We would expect it’s the
predominant "Except For" uncertainty, but "Except For"
opinions are not for the public market, because there is 
a group which looks upon those with a bit of disdain.
And neither are disclaimers very often
seen in the public markets, but in the private markets
I don't think we have statistics, but if you get out of
the area of uncertainties, Bill, then there are a
significant number of adverse opinions, "Except For" 
opinions, and perhaps disclaimers, although I'm not so
6sure of that, except that that's something that deals
with items other than uncertainties.
Uncertainty, I think, is by far the prior
form of modification of the report.
MR. HUFF: The auditor's standards that
run to his representation that the audit has been
performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards are retained, so if there is an elimination of
the auditor's scope, that type of a qualification
certainly is retained.
And in addition, the auditor has an
opinion with respect to conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles of the financial statement,
and if there is an exception to that opinion, either
because of disclosures or because of wrong accounting
in terms of measurement standards, that is obviously
retained as well.
In addition, we haven't mentioned there
are other types of auditor references that would be
retained and aren't affected by this proposal.
For example, a consistency reference
where there is a change in accounting standards.
7The auditor’s reference as a consistent application
of accounting standards would be retained as it is,
so there would be an obligation to retain the accounting
principles and for the auditor, in his report, to make
reference to that change.
So it just deals with the area of
uncertainty, where the financial statements aren't wrong
in terms of adequate disclosure, in terms of adequate
measurement standards, but there is the uncertainty with
respect to a contingency of one concern —
MR. KEALY: Well, I am sure unac I would
stay with the statement, hearing all the explanation,
that I made initially that there would be in the opinion
of the individual analysts and the representatives of
the corporate finance activities that I spoke with, that
say an uncertainty like litigation or an uncertainy like
some — well, stay with that, litigation, for the moment;
were there to be no "Subject To" opinion potentially
usable by the auditor, even though I understand why the
auditors — you know, we aren't reporters, we aren't
evaulators of these facts, et cetera, et cetera.
But there is a belief that that potential
8language in the auditor’s statement does encourage fuller
disclosure of those items or gives prominence to those
items, and that you have access to the counsel of the
company that’s actually litigating the matter, and so
forth. And often we don’t, and there is a barrier thrown
up, "This matter is in litigation, we can't disclose it,
period, go away."
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: The fact that you
brought this up, it's very good because it’s why we need
to have this meeting more than anything else, because
Bill's point is their perception, and we understand that.
Our goals are exactly the same. And your
perception is elimination of the "Subject To" will weaken
our ability to insist on good disclosure.
That's precisely the argument of the
majority that want to eliminate, because they believe
elimination of the "Subject To" takes away some of the
clout the auditor has, because if he's forced to go to
an "Except For" opinion, which is "Except For the failure
to adequately disclose," that's a much stronger insistence
on adequacy of disclosure, so that doesn't mean — I'm not
arguing who is right, I am only pointing out to the group
9that we come with the very same objective and the very
same concern, and reach precisely opposite conclusions
as to what best accomplishes that.
Paul?
MR. WYCISKALA: Speaking to Bill’s point 
of the perception of the users of statements that denying
the use of "Subject To" would make the. preparers feel
comfortable with less disclosure, those preparers that
I've talked to speculate just the opposite, that if the
auditor feels as if he's losing some protection, which
is perhaps put in more jeopardy by being denied the use
of the red flag, that the auditor is likely to be more —
to use more concern about contingencies and their
adequate disclosure in the statements.
Indeed, we expressed the opinion that the
audit fees might even go up.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That's an advantage
we hadn't noticed for the last —
MR. WYCISKALA: But at least the speculation
of those users I talked to is just the opposite.
MR. GREENE: I'd like to spend some time
with Bill. I notice most of the subjects just tend to be
10
litigation, that’s by far the largest category, and that’s
not just preparing an audit, that is also with the law
firm. And I think that’s why it’s a much more complicated
issue with respect to  litigation, because it's not simply
the preparer, but rather the judgment of the law firm as
to what can be said about a particular case.
How do you view the subject with respect
to litigation? You want a red flag to point out that 
there is some really serious litigation here that might 
not otherwise be spotted, because all companies have
litigation, and some can be significant and some not.
How do you use it in terms of litigation,
because that's the area I think of most interest to me.
MR. KEALY: Well, you'd have to respond
on a case-by-case basis. I mean, obviously the asbestos 
suits that affect Johns Manville and Eagle-Picher or
others that have qualifications because of that, or also
other companies, those problems were well known before.
As the evidence of the stock price shows,
those problems were well known before the ’’Subject To" 
opinion surfaced, but there are probably many, many other 
newer companies, smaller companies, companies that we
11
don't know as well, and which have not been as prominent - 
the litigation has not been so prominently displayed in
the papers, and so forth.
So you know, it just short-cuts and directs
you to an area of investigation that you would if you
were doing a job eventually get to. You get there a
little faster, you get there a little sooner.
I don't know how really to respond in the
abstract, we have to talk about specific instances. I
just know that procedurally we have to start someplace,
and one place we might start is —
MR. GREENE: Are you satisfied that
litigation disclosure is adequate, and this is just a
way for you to save time, or do you view the "Subject To"
as —
MR. KEALY: I think there have been many
instances, individual instances, where the feeling was
no, there wasn't enough disclosure in litigation, but
you know, it's — I realize the problems.
I mean, I can empathize with both sides,
but I think clearly no, the "Subject To" plus what's
disclosed, often isn't adequate. You hit these barriers.
12
And there is a feeling, maybe wrongly,
that the auditor has a little bit more clout and can
push, you know, for more information.
Now, I don’t know how the auditors would
know that we feel that the disclosure is inadequate,
because there is no dialogue there.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think we have a
perception you have better access to information some­
times than we do.
MR. MEBUS: Getting to that same point,
we have also seen where companies would try to resolve
litigation quicker so they can receive both benefits.
Getting back to the point that you made
earlier, Jim, that of not having or having, I think we have
seen companies — companies don’t like big negative
opinions, they like to keep as much information of that
as possible.
But even more so, we have found they
dislike having a negative opinion, and they'll do anything
to keep a "Subject To" off.
And we’ve seen them try to resolve it
faster. They're trying to do as many things as possible,
13
so they reduce the side benefits in certain actions
quicker.
And from our point of view, we see having
that as a tool for the auditor is a benefit.
MR. MULLARKEY: One comment that you made
about its causing the company to resolve this faster —
MR. MEBUS: They try to.
MR. MULLARKEY: You mean that to the extent
they might do something they wouldn't ordinarily do?
MR. MEBUS: I would hope not, but I think
they — knowing the pressures they come down to from
their shareholders, when they see that, they say, you
know — if they can accelerate a legal reaction, they
try to do that and try and promote certain accommodations,
rather than drag it out, resolve it quicker.
Whether or not they would do that if that
wasn't there — I just think the incentive, there is a
little more incentive pattern there.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Jim, did you have
something?
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, I would start to
say you have this "Subject To" opinion that's directed
14
to a footnote,you’re talking about a material potential
adjustment to the financial statement, and I don't see
how the auditor on the one hand can say it presents —
on the one hand can say it presents fairly, and in the
note somewhere say that there is a potential adjustment
that's going to change, or would have if we knew the
results, change the income statement.
So I mean it seems to be entirely con­
sistent .
MR. MULLARKEY: Not really, since the
footnote represents management's disclosure, ana the
auditor's opinion is really merely opining on the
financial statement in total, including the footnote.
So the footnote is not the auditor's.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Well, I would say maybe
the footnote is fully adequate disclosure, but it may
contain in it the potential for a material adjustment to
the financial statement, which it would seem to me is
quite different from whether or not there is full
disclosure.
And to the extent that the auditor draws
our attention as users to a potential adjusting entry
15
that's somewhere buried in the fine print, I think it's
very worthwhile.
MR. WATTERSTON: I don't disagree with
that, I agree with it.
MR. GRIMMIG: I'd like to support very
much what Jim just said. It seems to me the whole
argument is just that, that what it's saying in the
footnote, the auditor is saying that's management's
opinion, but that is subject to, in the lawyer's letter,
the auditor, not management, and by golly, as a financial
institution for 14,000 banks in the United States. I'd
like that ''Subject To” in the auditor's letter so we
don't get this kind of handwashing that's not the
footnote’s, not the auditor's.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I don't understand
that last comment. What is the handwashing? I don't
know what that means.
MR. GRIMMIG: A denial of responsibility
for the footnotes.
MR. MULLARKEY: But I guess the auditor
doesn't deny the responsibility for the adequacy of the
disclosure of the footnotes even though they are
16
management's because of' the "Except For" option. Was
that the point?
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, I think the point
is if there is a potential material adjustment to these
statements that's buried in the footnote, your proposal
would allow the auditor to give a clean opinion even
though had this uncertainty been resolved by the time
the auditor's report was issued, the statements might
look quite different, and it seems to me that's saying
we want the auditor to have some say about it.
Not whether management disclosed it
somewhere, but whether or not, you know, if the
uncertainty is resolved, it could happen —
MR. MULLARKEY: Well, the uncertainty
will not change what the auditor is reporting on, that
material can't be revised.
MR. WATTERSTON: No, we understand that
because of the rules. But if that uncertainty was
resolved by the time the auditor issued his statement,
the statement that we're looking at, analyzing it might
be completely different.
MR. MULLARKEY: That would also be noted.
17
MR. WATTERSTON: Be noted? Not by the
auditor, though.
MR. JONES: Yes, if anything happens
after the date of the financial statement but prior
to the issuance of the opinion that would be material
to those financial statements for the prior period,
then the auditor would be required to disclose that.
MR. WATTERSTON: I understand that, but
if it is unresolved, if you have an unresolved uncertainty,
which we all see every day, that's normal, and you would
give a clean opinion on that with the prior disclosure
in the footnote, but what I am saying is this: Doesn't
a user have the right to know that the statements he's
looking at would be quite different if that uncertainty
was resolved in an adverse way?
MR. MULLARKEY: Separate and apart from
the fact that the footnotes will indicate that?
MR. WATTERSTON: That's right.
MR. JONES: I think we have to make the
assumption, one, that the users of the financial
statements are reasonably versed in generally accepted
accounting principles, and that they're familiar with
18
the requirements of Statement No. 5, which requires
certain disclosures or the booking of certain liabilities
or whatever, for uncertainties.
We also have to make the assumption as
auditors that those people that are reading the financial
statements have a reasonable understanding of the
reporting standards that are required of auditors.
So I think if we make those assumptions
and the people are reasonably versed in that, then I
see that there is really no problem.
I do have a problem though with doing
away with the paragraph that allows the auditor to give
additional emphasis to certain matters. I don’t think
we’re talking about that yet.
MR. MULLARKEY: Right.
MR. JONES: I’ll talk about that a little
later.
MR. MULLARKEY: Yes?
MR. BROADUS: Isn't one of the reasons
for doing away with it that people aren't familiar with
what it means?
MR. JONES: I am saying as auditors we
19
have to make an assumption. You know, as auditors or
accounting standards bodies, you cannot promulgate
principles or auditing standards for the general public
as a whole, you have to put certain limits on that, and
I think the limits that you have to place are that those
people that are using financial statements are
sophisticated enough to have a reasonable understanding 
of both reporting standards and accounting principles.
You know, to allow Joe Blow, public —
and I am not saying anything bad, but I am saying there
are a lot of people out there that are unknowledgeable,
completely unknowledgeable of both accounting principles
and reporting practices.
And if they are, you know, I guess that's
their tough luck.
MR. MULLARKEY: Let me ask Bill Kinney a
question about research.
In looking at the "Subject To" opinions,
was there any agreement as to the amount of disclosure?
In other words, did the study show that the disclosure
was not really adequate on the statements, thus "Subject
To" statements were made without a proper foundation?
20
I am sure there must have been a lot of
uncertainties on financial statements where there were
no "Subject To” opinions.
There's got to be thousands of them.
Now, what really caused that, that there was not enough 
disclosure on the financial statements? Was it just
something the auditor said "I'll make it 'Subject To'"?
MR. KINNEY: On these stock price studies,
it's difficult to tell in reading the footnotes. Some­
times you think this is really a terrible thing, and it 
must be going to get a "Subject To" opinion, and quite 
often those would not be subject to a "Subject To"
opinion because the auditor decided in those cases not
to qualify, for whatever reason, and it's not entirely
clear why you would or wouldn't qualify.
But auditing standards and the interpretation
of auditing standards say the auditor should qualify 
the opinion if the lawsuit will probably be lost in
litigation, if the probability of resolution is adverse.
When the outcome of the event is probably
adverse, it probably will lose the case, then should you
have a "Subject To" opinion? That's what an interpretation
21
of FAS2 says the auditor should do.
Now, in at least one of the stock price
studies it is consistent with that view, that auditors
are qualifying on these more serious — not serious in
amount, but damages, because the amounts are indeterminate
as of the reporting date, but the probable assessment, 
and so the auditor in effect is required to predict the
outcome of the lawsuit, the probability of losing the case.
And management is not required to be
that definitive.
You’re talking about public interest in
this area. Someone argued that the management and
their legal counsel ought to be required to give the
disclosure of the probability of lawsuits.
MR. MULLARKEY: That’s the point I was
trying to get. Is the management then going farther than
legal counsel in saying this is the likelihood of its
happening, in saying management is giving more than the
auditor and their own general counsel is giving, is that
the role of the auditor?
MR. GREENE: The idea is to drive to the
footnote. Assume that the footnote disclosure is adequate,
22
especially with respect to litigation, and the club is
not going to be subject to disclaimer.
I find that very difficult, and it's
really the relationship between management,counsel and
the outside auditor, and I think the case has not been made
that we ought to abandon entirely the idea.
What you're saying is that we ought to
have a picture-box opinion, we can't emphasize it, we
can't point it out, we just say — one paragraph —
"Go to the footnote."
And what does the opinion or counsel mean?
What does management's judgment mean? And the "Subject
To" may be something that helps the world sort out how
companies really are in perspective.
But you're putting an awful lot on 5
to help out the subjects, but I'm really not certain
how much it can carry, even though it's working with
uncertainty, but to me that's a critical area.
MR. MULLARKEY: Does that mean that the
disclosure is inadequate?
MR. GREENE: I think it's a spectrum
disclosure.
23
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: You're in effect
saying that you believe that the auditor's report
irrespective of whether that is an appropriate role or
not, the auditor's report is an enhancement of the
overall disclosure?
MR. GREENE: Well, if you make me
characterize it that way, then you can point out that's
not an auditor's role.
I think there is accessed information
to management and so forth. I think they are signals
with respect to financial statements.
MR. PREWOZNIK: That's an interesting way
to put it, Jim. Certainly the average reader of a
financial statement, somebody who is not deeply involved
with financial statements as the auditor must be,
certainly is not in the same position to assess the
materiality of a particular contingency or a company
at a particular point in time.
Now, I can't sit there and look at these
statements for another corporation and arrive at the
same conclusion that the auditor of that company can.
For that reason, many of us do think that this "Subject To"
24
in the auditor’s opinion, this so-called red flag,
as everybody keeps referring to it, does have a very
useful purpose.
One point that Bill made, and I guess
Bob Mebus agreed with, is that the power shift from
the auditor to the client as a result of eliminating
a "Subject To" opinion is real. Another view of that
is the one that Tom expressed, and I'd like to just
emphasize that.
Many of us feel the power has shifted
in the opposite direction. Right now, the auditor
has a middle ground he can use. He can use these
"Subject To" opinions. Without the opportunity to
use a "Subject To" opinion, one can say that his power
is increased, either that he'll take a stronger stance
with the client, and that the client has to do some
accounting, and if the client does not feel that's
appropriate or the client has to put a definite
disclosure into his footnote, so it's not clear that
there is a power shift from the auditor to the client.
It could well be just the opposite.
MR. KEALY: Well, if there was evidence
25
that the auditor would use the "Except For" — I mean,
the disclaimer more aggressively than has been the
case, then maybe you can argue that the power shift
has been in the direction of the auditor.
MR. WATTERSTON: He doesn’t have the
same options.
We would not start with the presumption
that that would happen. We would start with the
presumption that without the "Subject To" the power
shift goes to the preparer.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I’m saying there might
be another presumption that might issue now.
MR. KEALY: I underscored the point
about the interpretative aspect with respect to litigation.
I can tell you from personal experience and from the
experience of others who are in the position of being
security analysts approaching companies, you know, you
really do run into a wall with respect to something
like litigation.
You're not given, normally, you're not
given access to trial counsel, to the individuals
involved in particular transactions, and the management
26
will, I don't want to use the word hide behind, but the
management will suggest that, you know, "We've said
everything we can say, this is a delicate matter,
we can't say more than we have said in the public
disclosure," and the management as the plaintiff is
never going to say, "We think we're going to lose this
suit."
You know, I think that's a reduction
ad absurdum that the plaintiff is going to say publicly
in a written document, "We're going to lose."
You know it ain't going to happen.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Bill, do you think
that given a plaintiff saying "I'm not going to lose,"
and a plaintiff's counsel saying "They aren't going to
lose," do you believe that the auditors are saying they
might when they give a "Subject To" opinion, and that
the auditor is entitled to that opinion?
There are two questions, I'll admit.
MR. KEALY: Let me state it differently.
There is no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff is not
going to say it. There is also no doubt in my mind
that because the plaintiff asserts they're going to win
27
that they are going to win.
I mean, I think it's up to the plaintiff
to assert that they are innocent. I think the auditor
would, the auditor could.
Whether the auditor has the obligation
to do that or the right to do it, I don't know. It
gets fuzzy.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: No. Do you believe
that when there is a "Subject To" that given a management
saying "I am going to win," and the management's counsel
saying "I am going to win," that when an auditor gives 
the "Subject To" that's saying we don't agree with you,
we think you're going to lose?
MR. KEALY: The simple answer is yes.
I believe that. It sure as hell makes for an interesting
dialogue.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Would it bother
you if I asserted that that's absolutely wrong?
MR. KEALY: Well, I don't ever like to
be wrong, but that doesn't change my presumption.
MR. WATTERSTON: I think probably the
auditor is saying there is a potential there and you
28
yourself better be aware of that potential when you
look at these financial statements.
It's as simple as that.
MR. MULLARKEY: Mr. Prewoznik.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I'm kind of searching
for a focus of this discussion. Let me take a whack
at it, particularly on the contingencies on litigation.
As I understand the present rules of
the game, the focus is about the definition of
uncertainty in FAS2. And as I understand — I hope
you can all help me if I'm wrong — the uncertainties 
that bring into play the prospect for "Subject To"
are the disclosure required when the matter is not
susceptible of reasonable estimation.
Let's put that in the context of
litigation contingency. We're dealing with something
that is a known litigation. The present rules would
indicate that if under FAS5, which came into focus
after FAS2, and probably these words appear in FAS2,
if under FAS5 you have a situation where you had a
litigation that needed to be handled in the financial
statements, but it couldn't meet the reasonably estimated
29
test of paragraph 8 of FAS5, then your only choice is
to state, if that outcome is at least reasonably
possible to be in the negative, or rather to estimate
the possible loss, or, as it says, "A range of loss,
or state that such an estimate cannot be made.”
So if you take the present format with
FAS2 and FAS5, if you have a disclosure under FAS5, the
only way FAS2 comes into play is when the disclosed
litigation hinges on the fact that you can’t estimate
the outcome.
And then FAS2 says "Well, footnote, we're
dealing in FAS5 with things that are material, we
aren't dealing with immaterial things."
1 I’m troubled by the fact personally —
and that’s why I’m not speaking for my committee, or
the auditing standards — my trouble is when you
finally get to paragraph 29 the ball game is whether
the auditor’s judgment in respect of one of these
matters that can’t be estimated is significant.
My problem is how do you sort out the
wheat from the chaff?
If all the FAS disclosures in the financial
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statement are by definition material?
I don't see any criteria anywhere,
unless maybe in some of these releases and interpretations,
and so forth. I'm concerned that there are no rules for
the auditor to determine what's significant and what's
not significant.
And I would feel it's better to encourage
diligence and completeness of disclosure under FAS5 to
get it all out, rather than to have, in my feeling, some
kind of a crapshoot in the judgment of the auditor as
to what's significant and what's not significant,
because I'm concerned there is a great risk there of
imperfection.
I don't think that's in the public 
interest. But I make these observations mainly to
focus, I think, that what we're talking about here is
the loss contingency with respect to which you can't
make a reasonable estimate. That's the focus.
Then the question really up for grabs
here is: is it a significant matter? And the present
literature, FAS2, seems to say that if it's a significant
matter in the judgment of the auditor, he's got to go
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"Subject To".
So I think that the issue here is how
can we expect these auditors to come to grips with
these questions of significance?
I think it's difficult. I've always
felt like that. Quite frankly, I've been in situations
where I've been intrigued by the sorts of head games
that go on in this area. I've always been troubled by it.
MR. KEALY: Can I ask a question.
If you particularize that, since it's
dangerous, but the way I can relate to that situation,
suppose you had a situation, a Johns Manville with
open-ended lawsuits and damages -- and today, as every
week goes by more people seem to be affected by them —
MR. BROADUS: Can't be reasonably estimated.
MR. KEALY: I mean it cannot be estimable,
and that appears in the footnotes and there is no
"Subject To” opinion, which there is now. We eliminate
the "Subject To” opinion, we say we eliminate six million
Americans, or whatever it has been, who have been exposed
to this, and it's totally unestimable.
End of story? That's adequate? To me,
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that is not adequate.
MR. BROADUS: But is that a significant
uncertainty or an insignificant uncertainty?
MR. KEALY: It's very significant.
MR. BROADUS: What is not significant?
MR. KEALY: That's life-threatening,
as significant as anything can be.
MR. HODGES: I am going to ask whether
or not the present draft is really going to solve the
problems that you raised, because I think the auditors
are telling us that if you don’t give all the disclosures
you deem material, and they think something is significant
enough, they'll take an "Except For” opinion.
MR. BROADUS: I don't think that the
"Subject To" goes to that. I think that the "Subject To"
is based on the assumption that FAS5 has brought forth
everything required under GAAP. It says that "Subject
To" should really only be driving you to read a
particular or several contingency footnotes that are
already adequate in describing the situation.
Presumably, if they are inadequate, for
example if it's almost certain there is a loss but the
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company will not admit it in the footnote, then it's
not GAAP. It's not "Subject To."
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Yes, it's covered
by 5. I personally don't have any — I mean, you said
"correct me if my analysis of the literature is wrong.”
I don't think any board members want to
correct your analysis of where we are.
MR. GREENE: So you'd say that eliminate
»
the "Subject To” and rely upon 5 with respect to
disclosure? In litigation, you're satisfied that 5 is
adequate today in terms of assessing the impact, or
litigation on a company, where it's almost impossible
to get — you rarely see any estimates of range of loss;
what you basically usually see is "It's a lawsuit, we
cannot estimate the possible likelihood of damages if we
lose."
They might tell you how many claims and
what's happened before, and settlement policies, and
so on and so forth, but is 5 adequate then with respect
to the disclosure of the impact of litigation on companies
today?
MR. BROADUS: If it's not, who should take
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the responsibility for the disclosure of this impact?
I mean, Ed, it either has to be there
or we've got a big problem with FAS5.
I don't have any experience, do you, where
you've been concerned where there is a disclosure in a
note in accordance with FAS5, where they come to a case
where they say— they give the various factors to the
extent that they can in keeping with FAS5, that "We can't
reasonably estimate the outcome, we can't do it."
Now, I think there are cases where the
auditors, if they feel that there is some shortcoming
on the part of management, that in reaching that
conclusion, you have ways of qualifying the opinion in
other ways, but if management does reach the conclusion
with its lawyers that they can't reasonably estimate
the outcome, but it's clearly painted, you've got a
Johns Manville, a big case, a big problem, what else do
you want the auditor to do?
I guess what I'm saying is it seems to
me that some of the words you use are seeking from
somebody else outside the company to tell you over and
above that what is the expected impact.
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MR. GREEN: I think there is a -- I think
the notion of a red flag is helpful, because I think
there is a tension between 5 and the auditor, and I
think, secondly, if you take out the "Subject To" and
assume that the disclaimer will result, that’s not likely
to happen.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: "Except For,” not
the disclaimer.
MR. GREEN: "Except For." What the 
assumption is, is that the club of the "Except For" is
so strong that you will say much, much more with respect
to litigation to avoid that, and I think that raises all
kinds of questions as to how you can adequately disclose
litigation, and the "Subject To" probably does give 
a pretty rough red flag to people who don't understand
sometimes how you —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, what information
value does it have beyond 5, though? I mean, yes, we’ve
pointed out and said, "Be sure and read this footnote."
The footnote says precisely what it would
say without that, so are you believing or is anyone
believing there is then an information value added by the
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auditor's report, be it that yes, he's probably made a
different probability assessment?
MR. BROADUS: I ’don't see that.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Well, let's assume
a situation where there are X number of people that
might or might not be affected, and it's pretty clear
that you cannot determine what the effect might be, and
that is clearly disclosed in the financial statements; 
how do you interpret the "Subject To" beyond that?
What do you read into the "Subject To"?
MR. KEALY: I just said that that
asbestos example is a tough one, because it's so widely
known, but there might be some other instance where the
adequacy of the disclosure is unquestionable, we can't
determine the impact, but if that was one of seven or
23 footnotes, you know, "There is a contingent liability, 
and we can't adequately determine the impact," and it's
right in there, number 11, and there is no "Subject To"
that pushes you to probe a little further. You may get
no more information disclosed.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: But Bill, your
point, you're I think saying that given — we're
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obviously talking about material items, or else it
wouldn’t trigger any of this to start with — a given 
piece of litigation, you’re saying that even though
management and the attorneys are saying that the amount
is not determinable and the outcome as to success and
failure is not, you’re believing that when there is a
"Subject To," the auditor has evaluated those pieces
of litigation as being more probable of adverse settlement 
' MR. KEALY: Or more probable of having
a material effect on this undisclosed —
MR. MEBUS: More material.
MR. KEALY: The answer is yes. Yes, more
material.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Both figure numbers,
super material as opposed to material?
MR. KEALY: Well, now we’re getting
into semantics. More material.
MR. MULLARKEY: Let me address Mr. Baker,
because Bill has elegantly described his approach, how
he would view the auditor’s report there, and when you
started out, I had an impression — I thought you were
saying when you saw the "Subject To," that led you to
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conclude that there was going to be more disclosure, 
but I think what I hear you saying now is the "Subject 
To" presents in your mind a disclosure which is not
otherwise presented in the financial statements in any
case.
If that’s a correct interpretation, I
would like to get Mr. Baker and Mr. Korn to see where
you are coming from and how —
MR. KORN: Well, it's a disclosure in
the non-technical sense of the word, a non-accounting
sense. It's more information, and I think we appreciate
the judgment and the independence of the argument, and
I think the argument for retention was well presented
in the issue paper, as well as the argument for elimination.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, you worried
us there for a minute.
MR. KORN: It's a very difficult resolution
problem, and obviously that's why we're here, and we are
interested in discussing it.
I just might add that speaking for myself
as a chartered financial analyst, as a member of the
Boston Security Analysts Accounting Committee, we favor
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retention. That’s where we come out on it.
But it's because the arguments in favor
weigh so strongly for elimination that I think it's a
very close call.
And Bill I think positioned it very, very
nicely.
MR. BAKER: Since the three of us
represent the same constituency, it won't surprise you
our views are parallel. There are nuances of interpre­
tation, but it won't surprise you that we come down
to the same conclusion, and I think it's helpful in a
discussion like this to remember the conclusion you're
trying to get to anyway.
When Jim set the stage for the discussion
to open the meeting, there was a desire to look at
every conceivable point of view from every conceivable
perspective, so that you made sure you touched on all
conceivable influences on a final conclusion.
But what we're really trying to get to
is should you eliminate "Subject To" or not eliminate it,
and what would be the prime criteria on that, that you
would use to reach that decision.
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I think with us it's a question of
whether it's an accounting policy which is useful to
users of financial statements or not, because we
represent a user’s group here, and there is a conclusion
that's almost inescapable from everything that has come
up here so far, and that is that some people find it
useful for some purposes.
We could take Bill Kinney's synopsis
of the research. He used a word like ambiguous. I think
that’s a common thread that's gone through many of these
  comments, and it's well to keep in mind what is really
meant by that phrase.
He used ambiguous to describe a study
that said some people used it and some people didn't use
it. I don't find that very ambiguous, it's useful to
some; therefore, it meets the test of being an accounting
standard, where I think the burden of proof in its
elimination should go to the other side.
In John Mullarkey's comments, he said
"This is a redundant concept, we now have reporting so
effective in other parts of the financial statement that
we no longer need it."
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Well, heck, the earning line of the
financial statement is redundant; you've got all the
income and all the outgo. It’s redundant.
No one needs to figure that out. This is
like that, it's a summary thing, it brings your attention
to an element that some investors wouldn’t notice other­
wise. Everybody doesn't have the time, but Goldman Sachs
institutional analysts do to pore through every financial
statement.
Many investors just grab that and look to
the "Subject To" as an important element.
MR. MULLARKEY; Let me take that just a
little further for a moment.
In two cases, where you have a litigation ■
let's take an absurd situation where you had an identical
disclosure of a similar event in the footnotes. In one
case the auditors concluded they could issue a clean
opinion, in the other case the auditors concluded they
could issue a "Subject To" opinion.
In both companies, how would you make an
investment decision, would that taint your decision in
any way?
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MR. BAKER: I believe where the "Subject
To" opinion came, the investors would be more aware than
otherwise in the case.
MR. MULLARKEY: But would it affect your
analysis of whether it is warranted or not?
MR. BAKER: In our case, I don't think
it would make a big difference, but I don't think it's 
fair to imply from the way we invest that other investors —-
MR. MULLARKEY: So from your standpoint not,
but you think from the standpoint of other investors?
MR. BAKER: Yes.
MR. KEALY: I would say definitely it would
make a difference.
Again, whether that's correct or incorrect,
I know your research says both of those stocks would have
adjusted in some way prior to the disclosure of the
opinion if the information was valuable and both stocks
would have adjusted previous to the "Subject To," and
there is no informational content that suggests that
they would adjust further after it, notwithstanding, I
think, there is some — to me, it's unique enough, you
know, the 37 cases or whatever the heck the numbers show,
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it would have to have some sufficient unqualifiable but
negative impact on the investor.
MR. GRIMMIG: I’d like to support what I’ve
just heard from this side of the table from a banker’s
viewpoint, and let me go back and give you a little
practical banking experience that I’ve had over 20 years.
We’re talking of public companies with
financial statements prepared by independent CPA's, and
the loan request that in general is going to be a million 
dollars or higher,in general. The junior analyst who first 
gets the three or five years of financial statements to
analyze is, frankly, a college graduate, maybe in a limited
number of cases in the money center banks an MBA, and
probably has had a 26-week training course, of which ten
in credits is the most you can expect from him.
He is probably using a computer now to do
some of the spread analysis, and unfortunately the
computer does not pick up footnotes and it cannot weigh
footnotes.
It does its analysis on numbers. The junior
who has to then put his work product to the sponsoring
line or lending officer, who would probably have to get
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his senior on it, so there will be at least loan officers
signing off. Those signing-off loan officers are relying 
to a great extent on the work product of a junior, as
practical banking experience.
That junior's work product can be second-
guessed only by myself or a senior officer pretty much
doing this through a credit file, or doing this through
an auditor's statement.
I do have the time and I do take the time
to look at that auditor's letter. I don't have the time
to dive into four pages or two pages of footnotes on
every item to make sure that the junior hasn't missed
a point.
I find it extremely helpful to have that
red flag in a one-sheet piece of paper that has a
prominent auditor's headnote, an address and a signature
at the bottom, rather than have the information perhaps
elaborated on in two or three-page footnotes on page 45.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Maybe one of our
problems here is not — at times when we do this, I know
it's going to sound as though we're eventually going to
argue with the user groups, but to get to the concept of
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usefulness which Dave brought up, and which we’re
obviously after, the flag itself, which you assert is
useful, is probably only useful if in fact our two
perceptions as to what it means are the same.
I’m concerned when I hear things like
’’I appreciate that auditor’s judgment.”
Now, what judgment is it that you
appreciate, that you think went into that "Subject To"
opinion? It is really rather critical to us, because we
acknowledge the usefulness argument. It's tough to say
that this third paragraph isn’t, you know, potentially
useful, but from our standpoint if we believe in fact
it's not useful in that it's being misused, and you
believe it's something that in fact it isn't, which is
really a very strong contention we have, if you believe
it's something we don't think it is, then it isn't useful
any longer, it's in fact disuseful. In fact, it's mis­
leading.
So when we say things like what is the
confidence, "I appreciate this and I appreciate this
judgment," what is it exactly that you think the
auditors have done, because I think that the analysis
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of 5 and 2 was essentially correct.
MR. BAKER: Jim, that sounds to me like
double-think. Could you explain to me the logic behind
that argument?
You say if it’s being misinterpreted by
people, you’re going to take it away so they won’t think
there is more there than there is; how does the absence
of it create more understanding?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Let me ask you —
I can't answer that unless I know whether I need to take
it away. I don’t think, because I don’t know whether it is
being misused, but I believe that if people think that
the auditor’s modifying an opinion to a "Subject To"
is necessarily a different concept of materiality beyond
what we already appreciate is material, whatever that
number is, whether it is an assessment of probability,
then those users are wrong, for that is not what is
intended.
MR. BAKER: If it’s neither an assessment
of probability, nor the special materiality, why does it
exist?
MR. MULLARKEY: That's why we're here.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That's why we're
here. I'm not sure it should.
MR. BAKER: Why does it exist in the 38
cases we are interested in, because somebody —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Because the literature
discusses it, and once the literature has it in it,some
auditor is going to find uncertainty in the situation and
say, "Gee, I'd better say this."
That doesn't go back to what the user
group believes —
MR. KEALY: One auditor for the on
one company reading these standards that have been
established for him or for her reaches the conclusion
that this is, either because of probabilities or because 
of the special materiality — you know, isn't that very
useful to the user to know that that auditor with those
standards reached that conclusion, and it has to be
reached either because of probably uncertainty or materiality
Somebody operating under a standard set
by this body says, "I need to put an extra little twist on
that, Paul."
MR. MULLARKEY: I think the issue to
remember — part of the issue to remember we are struggling
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with is that when the contingency and uncertainty issue
came forward, which discussed uncertainty, it was the
feeling of the auditing group at that time that that was
sufficient. There are always disagreements, we never
agree on anything totally.
There were disagreements, but that that
provided the adequate basis on which to discuss these
and that therefore we moved to eliminate it is as being
redundant. That was a redundant comment in that it was
redundant with what was required.
When we make the assessment we make the
assessment in relation to what is now required, but our
literature has been held to a position of being prior
to what was required that we now think is adequate.
So the decision is made in relation to
the same accounting standards as management would use
in coming up with their own view, but we have this
prior requirement which we feel, many of us who want to
eliminate it feel is inadequately articulated because
the current requirement is adequate for disclosure, but
the issue that we've been wrestling with is how can we
eliminate what we think is not useful.
MR. KEALY: Let me make one statement,
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with all due respect to the body assembled. Mr. Bailey 
was asking the question, you know, you have to make 
assumptions about the knowledge of users, do they have
adequate knowledge of the accounting standards and
the auditing standards. If you the user of financial
statements understand the subtleties just disclosed
or discussed, which is that the "Subject To" opinion
might be put forth by auditors who are operating
under standards which predated the issuance of the
FAS 5, I think I can assure you that they don't. The
sophisticated ones don't understand that particular
subtlety, so there is a problem right there.
Whether the unsophisticated user of
financial statements, the individual investor that
just happens to own 70 percent of the interest of
American equity, I'll give you a written guarantee
he doesn't.
MR. MULLARKEY: Initially we started
out with the concept that we thought it might be
misleading, and part of the misleading relates to the
fact that it takes a lot of sophistication to under­
stand this. Unless the disclosure standards are
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themselves adequate as to how we make our assessment,
then it is difficult for people to understand all those
subtleties.
MR. KEALY: I think that's very much
the case. I would also still revert back to my other —
even if we clear the air on that but certain auditors
operating with information with respect to the use of
the "Subject To" opinions that predates FAS 5 would
use a "Subject To" when they really shouldn't, et cetera.
If we clear all that up I still would come back to the
point that I think there is a subtle shift of — I would
worry about the disclosure question without some club,
and I am not sure that the "Except For" or the disclaimer
would be used often enough.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think we need to
take a short break, but let me get —
MR. MULLARKEY: Now we're going to have
the discussion between Board members.
MR. BAILEY: I get confused. I hear one
set of discussions in this general area indicating
that the sole purpose of "Subject To" is to drive
people to footnotes, and then another subset saying
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that the footnote disclosure isn’t adequate and therefore
we need —
MR. KEALY: No, no, no.
MR. BAILEY: Well, what I seem to hear
is that somehow the footnote disclosure must not be
adequate because the auditor has information apparently
that's not showing up in the footnotes, and this opinion,
which makes it kind of a unique opinion, has value in
itself, that somehow by putting the footnote "Subject
To" this is something that should affect your decision.
And I think it's one or the other. Are
we going to decide, are some of you going to state that
there is new information here that the auditors should
be involved in making these kinds of in a sense predic­
tions, and that's the function of the auditor, or are
we going to say that this is a red flag, in which case 
it's driving us to disclosure issues and the question of
disclosure, and "Subject To" it seems to me kind of
disappears when we. raise the question of do we have
adequate disclosure.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We really don't
want to discuss this
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MR. BAILEY: I know you don't.
MR. MULLARKEY: We spent three years
examining that issue. It isn't that we don't want to
discuss it. We just don't happen to make decisions on
that.
MR. BAILEY: But it seems to me that's
the issue, the nub of the disclosure issue, not —
MR. MULLARKEY: Well, to some people.
MR. BALL: What is so wrong about
giving the public or a portion of the public a red flag
in addition to the disclosure?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: It's back to the
same question as to what use are they putting it to
and do we have a commonality of understanding when you
put it to X use as an appropriate use for it, because
maybe you believe it's something we are not delivering.
MR. KEALY: I still haven't had the
answer, and I don't know that there is a common answer,
because there may be twenty-five auditing firms involved
in the thirty-eight opinions that have been slapped with 
a "Subject To" but if somebody in one of those operating 
firms operating under misguided information or whatever
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has decided that there is either a probable or extra
special or super special, whatever the phrase was, mater­
iality here, you might agree with if you were not doing 
the audit — not agree with because you might be doing 
the audit post FAS 5, but somebody felt that was 
material or probable, then I think that's important to
know. And I'd like to see more of that, not less of
that. I mean —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: There seems to be
a little confusion about the relationship between the 
auditing requirement and the accounting standards.
The point that was made is that the current auditing
standards stem from the time when the accounting
standards didn't exist, so the framework we have for
a lot of reporting is based on a financial reporting
environment when we didn’t have the body of accounting
standards that we have today.
So all auditors are applying the current
auditing standards for audit reports. It's not that
some are. Some are in a misguided sense using them —
everybody has to use them.
The question that is being raised is
that the reporting framework that we have today, that
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was devised at an earlier time — the question is is that
still appropriate, given the new accounting standards that
we have?
So the auditing standards, the need to
express a "Subject To" qualification, developed at a time
when there was much less sophistication in financial
reporting and the auditor had to make judgments about
the financial statements, and there was no guidance on
the accounting side about whether a contingency should
be adjusted for, approved in the financial statements,
or whether it should be disclosed, which ones needed to
be disclosed, and so on.
The accounting standards developed with
such broad probability items, saying when it was appro­
priate to adjust the financial statements and when it was
wrong to adjust the financial statements.
Under the older accounting guidance the
word more or less was you adjust whatever you can adjust.
If you can determine that something is going to happen,
no matter how far out in the future it is, then you make
that adjustment today.
That changed, and the accounting rules
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changed, so that it's — not only was it recognized that
you had to make some distinctions in probability, it was
recognized that it was wrong to reach out too far into
the future, that there were certain things that should be
adjusted for and that other matters should only be
disclosed.
So how the probability adjustment — or
how the probability assessment, rather, should affect
the financial statement, whether the statement should be
adjusted or whether the matter should be disclosed, and
how the determination and the amount entered into that
was then spelled out in the accounting literature, so
the accounting standards that both preparers and auditors
have to use in evaluating financial statements now
include those probability adjustments or probability
assessments, whereas before they didn't include them,
the auditor had to make them.
So we now have accounting standards that
say,"You go through this probability valuation and to
the extent, using the best ability you have to make it,
that you can make it, you do. That is not incorporated
in the financial statements.
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The financial statements reflect
everybody’s best probability adjustments about contingen­
cies and uncertainties. That is the preparers, their 
advisors, and that includes lawyers and auditors.
The probability standards that accounting
standards require are correctly reflected in the financial
statements.
Now the auditor is in the position of
having this old set of auditing standards in his report
that were devised at an earlier time when the treatment
of the probability adjustments in financial reporting
wasn't specified, so we have this old literature that
says that now that all those probability adjustments have
been made and reflected in the financial statements you
need to come along and make another assessment on top
of that.
MR. LANDSITTEL: I'd like to correct that
statement that statement five does solve contingencies.
There has been some presumption in the room today that 
statement five addresses every contingency in the finan­
cial statements, and it does not. It specifically
excludes certain kinds of contingencies, for example,
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the right of operating assets. There are some things 
like that that are under consideration by the Board
today involving recognition and measurements issues that
have not been resolved, and it should not be presumed that
all contingencies have been evaluated by the auditor.
MR. KEALY: I understand now very clearly
what you said about the auditing standards when they were
created, and the accounting disclosures. I didn't under­
stand it before this discussion.
I would guarantee you that users generally
don't understand that subtlety. I think that should be
cleared up, no question about it.
And once we clear it up I still come back
to my observation that I don't like eliminating the
"Subject To" because I think there is utility and value,
and so on and so forth, and I think there is this different
information.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We obviously are
going to come back to this same point because it's really
the only point we want to continue to discuss.
J.T. preempted something I was going to
say. He had sort of directed us towards litigation
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earlier this morning. I think it's easier to focus on
a type of contingency and to address the question we’re
discussing. There are obviously other forms of contingen­
cies .
We by and large lumped uncertainties
together in the auditing environment and said, "However
although there are other forms of uncertainties the
distinction should not impact this question.”
That isn’t necessarily going to be
accepted, and it may be a little confusing to the people 
that deal in the non-public company environment because
I think litigation is not necessarily — it does not
have the same frequency necessarily in non-public
environments.
Perhaps the going concern issue is the 
more prevalent one in the non-public environment.
I’d like when we come back to talk about
what we have talked about in a non-public company to see
if there isn’t something we'd like to think about
differently for the non-public company or the govern­
mental unit or whatever. I’m not sure the arguments
change at all, maybe they will or not, but I just want
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to make sure we don't overlook that.
The rest rooms are this way, down the
hall quite a long way.
(A recess was taken.)
MR. MULLARKEY: Just before the break
Jim Leisenring mentioned that he wanted to concentrate
some time after the break on non-public companies, just
in case we might have a different view.
Prior to that I would like to get some
observations from Chairman Knowles of the Ontario
Securities Commission, particularly as to the action
that was taken in Canada last year.
MR. KNOWLES: Listening to the discussion
this morning I'm somewhat reluctant to make some of the
comments you made note of. In Ontario in Canada with
the CICA we’ve done away with the requirement for the
"Subject To" clause, after much debate, much of which or
some is the same as that here this morning.
And as I said to a gentleman during the
debate, listening to you, I feel that you'd like to
peel the skin off the banana when people are forced down
to the real issues such as your discussion with Mr. Greene
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Mr. Chairman, because he banged away when it came down
to what is an auditor’s statement, its function, and so
on.
Come back to that and deal with the layers
of sophistication, we are concerned in Ontario that if
we had carried on the way we were going that the audit
report would grow in proportion to the length of footnotes
that have grown in context with the actual length of the
financial statements, inasmuch as they all are one and
the same, like the prospectuses have grown.
The audit report would have to be a precis
of the statement of the issuer.
To deal with that issue we tried to go
back to what is the issuer's responsibility and what is
the auditor's responsibility, and we came up with the
view that the auditor's responsibility is not to provide
an easy walk-through of the financial statements but
determining what is most material of something that is
material, to point a finger for credit analysis at a
bank or to provide a chartered financial analyst with
a quick report that he can give back.
We also tried to come to grips with
reality as the bankers and analysts are today, but we
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went a step beyond their surface comments by saying that
there is no chartered financial analyst in Ontario who 
would rely on the "Subject To" as pointing to a signifi­
cant difference in the notes.
There is no substantial credit lending
institution in Canada that would rely upon the "Subject
To" as the indication as to whether the credit should be
granted or denied in a particular loan application.
So the thing that we had to come to grips
with is who is the auditor and what is his job, and we 
determined that the — a lot of the input we were getting 
to maintain the "Subject To" and/or expand it came from
the basis — and this will sound strange from a regulator 
— but from the basis of a distrust of the corporate
mentality in our country, and as I hear your comments 
today, you have a basic distrust of the corporate 
entity in your community, so you’re looking for additional
policemen and you're looking for additional people to
second-guess the producers, if you will, in your society
another layer.
We agree that you have to have policemen
and we agree that the policemen should have a rule. The
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rule book that we chose was the Chartered Accountants
Handbook in Canada, and we said, "Those are the rules."
If we allow a lot of individual assessment
by auditors then we’ve done away with the rule book and 
we should go back to the historical analysis that you
went through with us and say, "There are no rules and
each auditor can choose for himself to say what he wants
to say and what the standards would say."
So we viewed the supplications that
you’re making to this body today as being destructive
of uniform standard setting, destructive in the sense
that you could lead to a particular situation if a
particular audit firm produces these "Subject To" clauses
that you mention you’ll get a shopping by issuers to those
that don't produce them.
One question that didn't seem to get
posed is if there is a "Subject To" clause in an audit
report and the stock price goes down in the context of
a public market and it turns out with hindsight that the 
item was not material, is the auditor subject to suit?
I don't know the answer.
Our society is not as litigious as yours
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yet, so it probably would not happen in our society at
the moment, but having taken some of my training down
here and knowing some of the professors that taught me, I
can imagine that there would be those that would be able
to take such a lawsuit in the United States.
So the only thing I can really add of
benefit to you is that I think you have not come down to
grips with the real issues which the representative of the
American Bar tried to get you to focus down on, what it
is you are discussing, but I thought you had to go a
layer below that, which is why do you have financial
statements and whose are they and what is the responsibi­
lity of the auditor?
If the chartered financial analyst is going 
to make a report for Goldman Sachs or Morgan or anyone 
like that, should he bear liability for not — if he 
doesn’t point up something in the statement? Why pick on 
the auditor to do other than say that the statements meet
the standards?
We ran into a couple of problems in
Ontario and in Canada, where we were getting close to
having different accounting standards in each province
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because of the what the regulators were doing, and 
we’ve backed away from that because we were falling 
into the trap I think you’re falling into by the 
dependency you are placing on the "Subject To" clause 
in that you do get down to subjective analysis, and that 
ultimately would destroy your uniform standards.
I don’t know if I can be of much more
help to you on that, because we didn't deal on the same
level of sophistication, we tried to go down and recon­
struct — the closest thing we did was to your historical
analysis, and then reconstruct what the roles should be
and the reports should be and who should bear responsi­
bility.
MR. MULLARKEY: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Any comments on
Mr. Knowles' remarks?
MR. GREENE: How long has Rule 2 been
in effect now?
MR. KNOWLES; 1980.
MR. GREENE: Is it too early to see the
results in having "Subject To" eliminated? Have you
looked at that at all? Do you have any plans to look at
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that to see what the impact has been on the conduct of
preparers and users?
MR. KNOWLES: We have not instituted a
study to look at it. We have received no complaints from
the users of statements including sophisticated users.
We have had no complaints that there have been any
misleading statements go through, and rather than putting
out a force of policemen to look at the situation, we
are going to wait for the investment community to come
back to us, and no one has come back.
I think we also determined that the
thrust that’s been taking place here today on the "Subject
To" clause is too much a spoon feeding and that government,
by which I include the private associations as well,
where there are bureaucracies, are trying to hard to
make sure that the average person, whoever he is, because
he’s never in the room when you discuss it, will be
taken care of that you are removing all initiative and
his ability to think.
It’s the old problem we have with
socialism that’s been cradle to the grave, and now we're
trying to ensure that whenever you invest you're
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obviously assured of a return because there is no 
statement out there that wouldn't lead you to invest
unless the stock was going to go up, and I think
somewhere along the line you'd have to draw the line
and say on a cost benefit analysis, "This issuer with
his auditors say these statements meet the standards,"
not any subjective analysis by the auditor, "You're
on your own, they meet the standards."
Somebody tried to bring that up today
and got sidetracked, but don't change the standards by
saying to the auditors, "Why don't you fiddle with them
a little bit." And I think that's what's happening.
But no, a direct answer: We are not going
to do any analysis, we've decided that we'll let our
investors take their lumps. If there are any problems
they can come back and complain.
MR. GREENE: What I am saying is that also
means that you're satisfied with respect to disclosure
standards as contingent liabilities in FAS 5? That
would be comparable.
MR. KNOWLES: That's right. We had one
conflict when we — in the removal of a "Subject To"
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clause which was put into effect. Some people were not 
satisfied that there had been sufficient public
education to the users statements, that the qualification
was going to be — that the opportunity to use the
qualification was going to be removed. It had come
up in all the professional journals and was well done
that way, so we required that they either state the
change — change the contingency item on the basis of the
balance sheet or that the management put a note to it,-
up in front besides the auditor’s statement,saying that
there had been a change and that there were contingencies.
What we hoped they would do is that the
auditors would say there had been a change in their
standard procedures since the last annual report. We’re
still having that fight with the CICA only because they
move slowly, like all regulators do, and we are keeping
our ban on until they conform to the statements that
whenever there is a change in the substance and standard
setting that will be mentioned in the auditor's reports
in the year of change, so two years down the line it
no longer has to be mentioned because it's no longer in
the year of change.
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MR. GREENE: Do most people go into the
clean opinion so that the "Except For" is not cropping
up at all?
MR. KNOWLES: "Except For" is not a
problem with us in Canada. Our auditors when they come
to an "Except For" situation in practice — and I was
in practice for 20 years — that’s so terrible that it
can be removed, the cause of the "Except For" is removed
and dealt with. If it can't be removed, the "Except For"
goes in. So I would say again we have no statistical
analysis because we don't keep track of it, but there's
certainly been no ground swell on that.
MR. GREENE:. So most of the "Subject To's"
just become straight opinion?
MR. KNOWLES: That doesn't bother us in
the slightest bit, because all the "Subject To" does is
tell you that there is a note.And people are supposed to
read the notes if they want to rely on the financial
statement.
With the gentleman with whom I was
discussing it earlier I said, "Our investors may not be 
as sophisticated as yours, but our small investors aren't
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investors because they invest through pension funds, and
so on, so they invest with the benefit of that."
Our small investors are doctors and lawyers
and dentists. Mostly they like to look at the glossy
pictures and then read the president’s letter, how
glowing it is, the company. If he's very sophisticated
he'll look through the balance sheet and look at the
net worth side to see if there is a lot of money there,
then look to see if they made a lot of money or lost it,
and then make his investment.
Most of our investors invest because a
registered representative or investment dealer has
phoned them up and told them to invest, they've got a
hot tip, in which case they're not going to read the
financial statements anyway.
I say we did try to do it pragmatically
and as I say, we are concerned in my province, in my
country, that the degree of sophistication that's being
imposed upon the issuers of financial statements is getting
to the point where you have improper disclosure because
it's so sophisticated no one can really understand it,
and that it's putting a burden well beyond the cost. We'd
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be better off to have some people burned on investments
than the costs we're imposing upon them. We’re diverting
the human resources rather than their financial resources
away from the thing they're good at, doing their business.
So we're going to try it for a decade and
see where the lumps are.
MR. WATTERSTON: The presumption is that
the disclosures are adequate, and I would take exception
to that. We get in litigation and other types of
contingencies some fairly bland statements that usually
management and management's counsel believe that these
things will be resolved favorably.
What we want to know is what are the dollar
involved. That's often not shown. What impact this
could have on the statements if they are resolved
adversely, and that's usually not shown.
So if we can be directed or rely on the
auditor to make a judgment that there is something there 
that's potentially adverse, then at least we can delve
into it further, and we've all had the experience of
talking to companies after we've seen the "Subject To"
and read the notes, and we might find out a little more.
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So I don’t think that disclosures are
as complete as you're presuming them to be.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I’d like to ask a
question that might be embarrassing. We had a discussion
during the break. Under FAS 5, and keeping in mind the
American Bar Association's fine policy statement on the
responses to auditors —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: What was that,
fine policy statement?
MR. GREENE: From a lawyer's point of
view.
MR. PREWOZNIK: In the areas of litigation
it is regarded generally I think as rare that you get
a response from a lawyer who says the outcome is
probable to be adverse to the company. Most of the time
you're dealing with the reasonable possibility type of
litigation.
Assuming though that you do get an
opinion like that and you can't estimate the outcome, and
you get an opinion from your lawyer and he says, "Well,
I'm going to tell you it's bad news" — I mean it's
tough to conceive of those facts — does GAAP operating
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through FAS 5 or otherwise believe that a fair disclosure 
or a fairness presentation would require that the 
disclosure in the footnotes distinguish a litigation
where there was a probability of adverse outcome?
MR. LANDSITTEL: Yes.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Yes.
MR. PREWOZNIK: That was my assumption.
We couldn’t find that spelled out in FAS 5, but I couldn’t
believe it otherwise.
*
Again, if that's true, if that's true I
don't think — I think there's been a great misunderstand­
ing on the part of users that the auditors are passing
judgment further on this issue.
MR. WATTERSTON: What you're saying is
if the attorneys say the outcome is going to be adverse —
but you also said the attorneys seldom say the outcome
is adverse, so you have a Plaintiff and a Defendant
with both attorneys saying they're going to win, and we
know that can't happen.
MR. PREWOZNIK: But are you looking for
the auditor to tell you something?
MR. LANDSITTEL: The auditor is not in a
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position to second-guess that judgment.
MR. WATTERSTON: No, but just to say there
is potential major adjustment to the statements and —
MR. LANDSITTEL: Well, that's a very
difficult responsibility for the auditor. Once you
accept that the disclosure rules are adequate and then
ask the auditor to make a probability assessment with
those same facts, it goes beyond that.
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, you've got a
lot of facts at your disposal that don't show up.
MR. KNOWLES: Aren't you asking for a
change in standards? You're saying that in the
financial statement that you would like to see there
should be a disclosure, a mandatory disclosure by
management, the bottom line if they lose and the top
line if they win.
MR. WATTERSTON: Yes, I guess I am, but
I don't think that's likely. There are a lot of good
reasons why managements don't want to disclose what these
outcomes are, because they don't want the other side
in these litigations to know.
So I guess I'd rather stay with the way
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we have it, let them be a little vague and have the
auditor: bring our attention to it.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: But what is it other
than "Be sure you read this note," that we admit is vague
and. not very meaningful, or at least we’re saying that,
what else does the auditor bring to put on your plates for
analysis, I mean, other than that "Be sure and read this"?
Do you think there is information content
in the mere fact he modifies his report?
MR. WATTERSTON: I guess I would come down
and say it is. On the one hand we say the statement
presents fairly, and so we're saying that the auditor has
some responsibility for the overall fairness of the
statements. And then somewhere in the footnotes it says,
"There could be a major adjustment to these statements."
So how does that relate to fairness?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: The fact that the
Board did not properly resolve the fairness issue when
it had the opportunity to earlier is not the subject.
MR. MULLARKEY: One of the issues that has
come up in our discussion as it relates to this discussion
is if we were to retain the "Subject To" then we should
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describe the criteria more clearly that have existed for
some time, so that auditors can arrive at common decisions.
We're looking for that. You don't want all different
decisions.
The difficulty in that investigation or
that articulation is the fact that as auditors we look to
GAAP to describe the situation and to make a determination
as to whether the disclosure is adequate, so we live within 
the environment of the standards as they're set, and we 
have always — and that's one of the reasons we're having
the discussion — we have always had difficulty among
ourselves trying to say that if we acknowledge that the
disclosure standards are adequate, how do we reach separate
decisions in such a way that we can articulate, having
agreed in the first instance that they seem to be adequate?
So I mean that was underneath the questioning
as it relates to the utility you get from it, how would we
look at whatever it is that we should generally articulate
when the accounting standards are what they are?
And many have made a statement that there
is more to it when the auditor gives a "Subject To" opinion
that is different, maybe different than what the GAAP
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requirements are, and we are stuck at that point, because
we use them too, we don't have another set.
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, I wouldn't underestimate
the difficulties that you face on this issue. You know,
maybe we should change the standards. But until we do maybe
we ought to stick with the "Subject To."
MR. KINNEY: In this area we're talking
about — I am not sure I heard fellow Board members answer
this correctly, as I understood the question a moment ago.
In the case of the litigation in which it is at least
reasonably possible that a materially adverse case may be
lost, the financial accounting standards require footnote
disclosure of this at least reasonable possibility, but it
doesn't require the management to say that "We expect to
lose this case."
In other words, they don't make this — they 
say "It's at least reasonably possible there may be a 
material adverse outcome," but not particularly "We're 
going to lose the case."
Now, the auditing standards now indicate 
the auditor should modify the opinion, should qualify the 
opinion if he feels he or she, it's probable they’re going
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to lose the case. This is a case where the "Subject To" 
opinion is not really redundant with the FAS 5 requirements, 
because it goes beyond that, because it says, "Give a 
separate signal if the problem is they're going to lose
this case."
Now the question is, from the public's
point of view, is that useful information and should
management be making these disclosures or should the 
auditor be making these disclosures? And that is —
MR. CARMICHAEL: One thing you should add,
Bill, is while the literature does say that you cannot
estimate the amount but you've got to know that even
though you can't estimate it that it is at least
material and it’s probable there is going to be an
adverse outcome, then you need to qualify the opinion
subject to qualification, but that is the extreme, that's
the clear one.
MR. KINNEY: That's right.
MR. CARMICHAEL: Now, there will be other
cases where a "Subject To" opinion will be given below
that.
MR. KINNEY: That's correct.
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MR. CARMICHAEL: Where the adverse
outcome is reasonably possible, and those will also get
"Subject To" opinions.
So there isn’t anything that when the
"Subject To" opinion is given lets the reader of the
financial statement know —
MR. KINNEY: — Which it is.
MR. CARMICHAEL: — which "Subject To" it
is. It could mean that the adverse outcome is probable 
and that "We don't know exactly but it's big," or it could
mean that it's a big amount, we don't know what the outcome
is but an adverse outcome is at least reasonably possible.
That whole spectrum is covered by "Subject
To."
MR. KINNEY: And the responsibility is
solely on the auditor. The management doesn't have to
say, "We expect to lose."
And with a stock price study it's useful
to know this but it's not part of accounting standards.
That's the question that's then discussed here.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Bill and I discussed it
at the break, and I took issue with the comment that the
auditor takes responsibility for assessing probability.
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I think we’re both looking at this auditing interpretation
of January ’76. I think he takes premises that are given 
to him by the company and his lawyers about whether a loss 
contingency, negative outcome, is reasonably possible to
probable, and then if the premise is reasonably possible
then the standard or the supplement, as I call it, to the
standard or interpretation says he might modify his 
opinion. What does that mean? God only knows.
It's an anachronism. I am absolutely 
convinced that it is.
Then the other one says when the events
that will resolve a contingency are probable, i.e. likely 
to occur, then the auditors should modify it. But I don't
believe I've ever understood it but the auditor is making
that judgment as to probability. He's taking that as a
presentation in accordance with GAAP in those financial
statements.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: It is not clear
whether that —
MR. PREWOZNIK: I know it's not clear, and
it's not clear over here because I think some people over
here have the impression that the auditor is constructing
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the premise on its own, independent from the issuer, and
the company or the lawyers, and gosh —
MR. CARMICHAEL: I don’t think the big
concern occurs when the auditor has reached the conclusion
that the adverse outcome is probable and I do think that
you’re right that the most likely reason that he would
have reached that conclusion is that the lawyer believes
this is one of those rare circumstances when he can say an
adverse outcome is probable.
So I think what was said before using the
probability framework that we’re given by statement five 
is that between outcomes that are remote and probable, which
lawyers can opine on if they believe that the information 
at hand permits it, there is a wide range called, "Reasonably
possible.”
That range is so broad that I would say
some of the comments before, using these terms, are saying,
"We want the auditor to pinpoint on that reasonably
possible range whether it's closer to probable than closer
to remote, we want something to give us more information
in this reasonably possible range, so we want the auditor
to be the one that says where on this scale the particular
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litigation lies."
MR. PREWOZNIK: Right.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Which I assume is not
something which most of us, I presume, are very capable 
of doing.
MR. PREWIZNIK: And it’s not what your
literature has been telling you you are doing. Your
literature to me is just what we’re talking about, the FAS5
even where you’ve got material, non-estimable, uncertain
MR. GREENE: Even there are standards,
these are very difficult professional judgments to make
if you get into a contingent area in terms of possible,
magnitude, and so forth.
If you get into a question that suggests
the accountant is really involved in making these judgments
or not, because if you take it away the assumption is what
will happen to the conduct of the participants, and I 
think the "Subject To" from the informational viewpoint 
suggests,these flags to me suggest that these are very 
difficult decisions to make in respect of these things.
When we deal with standards that are
fairly amorphous, I think in 5, I think the "Subject To"
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gives some comfort to people on that point. I may be wrong
I am not a financial analyst, but I've been involved in the
process of advising, and I must say lawyers don't ever give
a yes or no; I mean lawyers have a variety of opinions.
I mean they can give you a "Free from doubt," "It's not
free from doubt," and so forth, they can scale down.
You basically are saying you've got to
go yes or no, and it's got to be clean, there aren't a
variety of judgments that can be made, and the "Subject
To" says if you can make it it's clear.
MR. FAULS: If you can articulate what
auditors mean when they say "Subject To."
There's a story I heard about Ernie Byfield,
who ran the Ambassador East for some years, the Pomp Room,
for some 30 years. I asked him why he served the meat on
a flaming sword. He said, "The customers like it and it
doesn't hurt the meat so much."
So if you can articulate what you mean it
makes people happy.
MR. MULLARKEY: Could I ask how this is
actually used, how the "Subject To" is actually baked
into the investment advice that is distributed to people,
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on which they make investment decisions?
MR. CARMICHAEL: Or lending decisions.
MR. MULLARKEY: Or lending decisions.
Because I mean that must be what we’re looking for.
MR. KEALY: Let me say this: There have
been a lot of statements made about — this is not a
simmer process. The security analysts — let me talk for 
the security analysts in the U.S., just like the security
analysts in Canada — do take responsibility for what
they say, do go through all published financial information
and then some. We do talk to competitors, suppliers,
customers and lenders, et cetera. And there is no assumption
that this is a specific process.
The only thing we do is wait till we see
a "Subject To" decision, opinion, make a sell recommendation
and go home, that is a gross oversimplification. Let me
just get that out of the way.
How do we use it?
We don’t use it in any way other than What
I’ve said and what's been said here, that it is one element
which directs us to probe somewhat further in one particular
aspect of the financial statements and disclosure of the
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particular issuer.
It doesn’t mean we don’t look at the other
footnotes, it doesn’t mean we don’t ask resilience questions 
many of which are maybe useless or what have you, but you 
know, it’s a flag, it is something which — we don’t write
a report at the end of which it says, "And oh, by the way,
this company had a qualified opinion."
I've never seen that in a published research
report. I am not saying it doesn't exist, but I've never
seen it in a published report.
But it directs us, and there is a presumption
perhaps incorrect for technical reasons which I wasn’t
aware of, but there is a presumption that the auditor does
have more information and access to more people and an
ability to discuss these issues at greater length and
does step back, taking the opinions of counsel, taking
the opinions of the management, perhaps seeking other
opinions of other counsel or other observers of the
scene, and reaches an independent conclusion, and
occasionally throws that "Subject To" or some of a
disclaimer or qualifier in there, and it is used by us as
a — you know, as a flag, no more, no less.
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It doesn't mean we don't look at the cash
flow statements and everything else.
MR. LANDSITTEL: I think you're mentioning 
two things, one of which makes me more edgy than the
other. You know, pragmatically just the fact that it's a
matter of emphasis helpful to you I think is a legitimate
user benefit.
MR. KEALY: I mean you get to it on Monday
rather than Tuesday, that particular issue.
MR. LANDSITTEL: So just to say it directs 
me in the right direction, if it's the right footnote, as an
emphasis, that's one thing, purely as a matter of emphasis
as a purported benefit. That doesn't disturb me quite as
much as the seeming reading between the lines and says,
"Yes, I heard what the footnote says, and the footnote 
might say there is an uncertainty with respect to the 
outcome, which typically is what the footnote will say
when there is an auditor's opinion as to that.
The footnote will not say typically that
the attorneys in the company believe that there is no
material meritorious contention by the Plaintiff. I mean
typically the footnote will parallel the opinion and
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say that there is uncertainty because there it is, the
facts of what the attorneys and the management information
they’ve given to the auditor is, and it does bother me a 
little bit that you assume that the auditor has — you
read between the lines more than that and say, "Yes, I
hear what the footnote says but I really know there is
more to it than that, that the auditor has more information,"
and that is a role that, number one, I don't think is
quite factually correct, because typically we don't have
any more than what we honestly want to have fairly
summarized in the footnotes, and secondly, even if it were
to be correct, it would be a type of responsibility that
makes me uneasy to accommodate, because I think it was
said by Jerry a little earlier that it's not necessarily
our role to go that far, even if that were to be a user
need, because disclosures are inadequate.
MR. KEALY: Well, I can understand fully,
you know, why the acceptance of the responsibility — or
the unease necessary with respect to that responsibility,
which is awesome. I fully respect that and agree that
that's an awesome responsibility,and perhaps an inappropriate
responsibility in the context of what is the role of the
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auditor.
I also believe — and again we can distinguish
between reality and presumptions here, but my presumption,
and I think shared by many people, is that the auditor
with respect to the issuer is in possession of more
information, maybe not better, maybe not — you know,
I can believe that you're in our offices continuously, 
talking to people continuously, and you don't have more 
information than a security analyst who shows up Tuesday
and gets an hour with the public relations guys?
MR. MULLARKEY: Well, listening to what
you're saying, it's more information, it's relevant, and
it's not disclosed. Isn't that all true?
MR.KEALY: Well, that I don't know. I can't
say that it's all relevant. A lot of it is irrelevant.
A lot of the information that we gather
and seek so assiduously is irrelevant too, and —
MR. MULLARKEY: Well, you're deducing
something out of it, which must mean it's not disclosed
when you read it.
MR. LANDSITTEL: I think the auditor would
believe that the responsibility is to make sure that all
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of that voluminous information, that that part that is
material has to be properly summarized independent of the
issue of the "Subject To" opinion.
MR. IVES: I think there is —
MR. GRIMMIG: I’d like to say this: I
think it takes a lot of guts for the auditor to put that
"Subject To" in his first page rather than Page 42,
and I think the credibility he gets from the banker
that he’s raising this red flag in Page 1 and not in a
disclosure in Page 42 makes a better impression on the
banker, and the banker then sees that the auditor perhaps
is more independent of his customer, and you've got a
different credibility viewpoint from the banker or the
lender.
MR. CARMICHAEL: How does that affect what
you do, would that lead to more loans for people with
"Subject To" opinions?
MR. GRIMMIG: I think it would probably do
that, yes, because we would make a decision, one of
perhaps perception of greater independence and guts on
the part of the auditor, and two, we would go back to the
company and to the auditor, if we had the company's concern
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and get additional backup.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, then I’m doing
a disservice to my clients if I don’t give them a ’’Subject 
To” opinion when they have a significant uncertainty,
because they have a better chance in the financial market;
is that what you’re asserting?
MR. GRIMMIG: I think possibly so.
A SPEAKER: At least with Chemical Bank.
MR. JONES: I think there is a great
misconception about the auditor’s responsibility. Management
has the responsibility for preparing those financial
statements. The auditor's responsibility lies within
stating an opinion on whether or not those financial
statements present fairly the financial position and
results of operations in confirmity with general accepted
accounting principles.
Now, from what I understand you’re saying,
the auditor is going to look at more if he has to "Subject
To” that opinion for a contingency rather than if he stated
an opinion, you know, from the fair presentation of those
numbers.
That’s not true. As an auditor that
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individual is going to look at the very same information, 
you know, regardless of whether or not a "Subject To" 
opinion exists, versus an "Except For" because he’s going
to look to see that that note in the financial statement
presents fairly what is happening.
And if he in his opinion or his judgment
thinks that note does not provide adequate disclosure then
he is going to "Except For," and you know, say, "Except
For, I believe that this note does give adequate disclosure,"
and give what is his opinion of what should be adequate
disclosure in the opinion.
And you’ve got as much information, you
might even have more under the "Except For" concept than you
would the "Subject To."
MR. WATTERSTON:Well, you might, but I'd 
still go back to the statement I made earlier that if the
footnotes contain potential material adjustment to the
financial statements, I find it difficult to understand
how an auditor can say on Page 1 that the statements
present fairly. They do subject to the outcome of this
and how it might adjust the statements.
MR. JONES: Well, they do at a point in
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time, and you know, we're not predicting the future. As a
matter of fact, ethics prevent auditors from predicting
the future.
But his responsibility lies, if his year-end
is 12/31, in whether or not those financial statements
present fairly at that point in time.
Now, if something comes to the auditor's
attention subsequent to that time but before the issuance
of his opinion, then he would be required to give you
additional disclosure.
As a matter of fact, if something came to 
his attention even after the opinion was given, that would
— additional information that would lead him to believe
that those financial statements were not fairly presented,
then he would be required to give you additional disclosure
in separate letter.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Bruce?
MR. HUFF: I've listened closely to the
investment analyst approach and the information there, and
I've heard some comments from the banking community view, 
and I'd like to address this question to Mr. Huntington.
I'm really enthralled with the approach
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described, because I deal mainly in a non-public setting, 
and many of your decisions, a large portion of the
numbers of decisions, are made in that region, and I'm
curious because I know that a lot of our client situations,
not much different than anybody else, a lot of the
information presented to the bank is unaudited information.
If we have that information sometimes a
part of it is internally developed information,and in
those cases there is a lack of any disclosure regarding
contingency, and in fact, most of the bankers knowledge
from what I have seen in many of our experiences comes
from drinks they had at the country club or some dinner
that they had. I mean I'm not going to be facetious, it's
my perception of what I understand that the bankers really
gather information from, knowledge of the client and the
customer, in really obtaining an in-depth knowledge there.
My real question is I'd like to pursue
the lending aspect, having heard a lot about the investment
the lending aspect.
I haven't heard any description of how one
would use the qualified opinion that is there as a tool to,
maybe from a checklist standpoint, indicate that we’ve got
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a problem there. I have not seen that necessarily in the 
dealings that I have had, and I guess I’m moving toward
the non-public sector, but I'm curious, Mr. Huntington,
as to what your comments would be on the decision process.
MR. HUNTINGTON: Well, the decision process
of lending officers varies with lending officers. There is
no clearcut way to say that every lending officer is
guided by the same signals, the same information data
has been set.
But I think it is clear that wherever there
is a report of an auditor containing a "Subject To" clause
that it's a clear red flag and it does trigger additional 
inquiry into the contingencies or uncertainties pointed out
Now, you're asking me in instances where
there is not an auditor’s report?
MR. HUFF: No, let's just stick with the
auditors, keeps it more simple.
What I am really curious about, that's
used as a red flag list in those situations — you said 
that it's used as a red flag to lead you to further
inquiries, I assume of other customers —
MR. HUNTINGTON: No, you would go back to
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management, possibly, if management gives you permission,
to discuss with the auditor why he enumerated that
particular one in his report, then you’d pursue that as
well.
MR. HUFF: To go beyond the financial
statement disclosures or the auditor’s reports?
MR.HUNTINGTON: It certainly tips you off
that in the auditor's opinion there is a material
uncertainty or contingency threatening, perhaps even
the continuation of the* business. Sure.
MR.HUFF: Because the description made
earlier of the analysis approach where the footnotes are
not really delved into too deeply in all cases, unless the
red flag is raised, is that an accurate description?
MR. HUNTINGTON: I think it varies
considerably with bank size. Mr. Grimmig represents a
very large firm where they obviously are making use of
computer-assisted statement analysis, and I am sure there
are people who are reading and carefully looking at the
footnotes, but there are many, 14,000 plus banks, out
there that don't have quite that degree of sophistication.
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People are busy, they're looking as carefully
as they can at those statements.
I think the more important point may be
rather than trying to analyze how any one particular
lending operation would function or react to a "Subject To"
opinion is the fact that clearly the studies that I think 
have been reviewed show that there is utility in this,
the "Subject To" clause is useful to lenders in their
analysis of the information and —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: It’s fair to say
there are studies that say it isn't true. I wouldn't
characterize them all that way.
MR. HUNTINGTON: Most of the ones I saw
did prior to its usefulness.
Now, again the point is maybe improper
inferences are given, and I would not disagree that we need
— that we would benefit by some more education. I guess
a question I'd like to throw out for consideration is
given FAS 5 and fuller disclosure in the footnotes, there
was a point prior to the summation of those standards where
it was felt that this was a proper role for the auditor to
call to the attention of the user, the reader, these material
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uncertainties and contingencies. And why just because the 
standards are clearer are you saying that was an invalid 
perception of his role once way back there?
MR. CARMICHAEL: No, audit reports —
MR.HUNTINGTON: No? In other words, if
we're all trying to make use of these statements, in our
case to allocate capital in the most constructive way,
and this is a useful signal to a user and reader of the
report, I'm a little concerned that we're trying to get
rid of something that is at least perceived by us, maybe
erroneously, as something useful.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That's a real concern.
I just missed that.
MR. CARMICHAEL: By historical analogy,
audit reports are frequently — if you go back far enough
you'll find audit reports that disclose the company's 
capitalization policy and fixed assets in the audit
report.
At the time there were no accounting
standards on what fixed costs should be capitalized at and
whether or not depreciation should be taken. That was an
issue, and when it was an issue audit reports disclosed
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those things.
We've come a long way since then, and the
issue is are we in that sort of situtation with uncertainties
do we have accounting standards that spell out how you
treat them and how you disclose them so that what was
the function that the auditor served by reporting on them
is now redundant and now may be misunderstood because
people think they’re getting a message from it that really
isn't there.
MR. LANDSITTEL: I think historically it's
always been a controversial role, but absent the standards
that we now have, there seemingly has been more of a
benefit to the assumption, however controversial, of that
goal than there might be perceived to be today when we
do have the standards that drive the disclosure and the
accrual to a possibility assessment that is required apart
from relying on the auditor's report.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Can I ask what I haven't
thought of before, but when Mr. Jones pointed out, properly
so, the distinction between the preparer's responsibility
for financial statements and the auditor's responsibility
for his opinion there, it dawned on me that perhaps you
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people think something that I hadn’t thought of before, 
so I’ll just ask this question: When a "Subject To" 
opinion exists on an uncertainty, is that an implication
to you that there is a disagreement with management?
MR. KEALY: I would say yes, that there is
an implication. And there is a presumption that there is -
MR. LANDSITTEL: Disagreement with respect
to the disclosures or disagreement with respect to —
MR. KEALY: No, with respect to the material.
I realize everything is material, and you know, the super­
materiality or the probability, I would say that that is a
very possible presumption. I can't say it's universal.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: What caused me to
believe that was Mr. Grimmig's comments with respect to
do we have a more independent auditor than the standards
allow because he modified an opinion. Do you believe
that these uncertainty modifications were "Subject To"
opinions and disagreements?
MR. MEBUS: We've seen cases where the
managements said that the auditors had to do it, but
first of all we're not going to lose, and secondly, it's
not going to be material.
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We’ve also seen cases where management told 
us, you know, "We know it’s coming," and they understand 
why it's coming. So it has varied.
MR. WATTERSTON: In response to the question
I would say as far as I’m concerned it does not imply that.
MR. HUNTINGTON: I think there is a burning 
question in a lot of people here now as a consequence of
this last discussion, and that is both the bankers and
the analysts and the SEC when you see a "Subject To"
opinion. The comment was made over here, "What do you
do?"
One of the things you said you do is you go 
to the auditors. Now, my question is do you ask them
why they went "Subject To" and if so what kind of answers
do you get? That to me is very important as to how you're
making use of this.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I'm not sure that
 
any said auditors. I mean they didn't, they said company.
MR. PREWOZNIK: But the auditor is the
one who made the judgment. To me the obvious question, if
you're really fascinated by this "Subject To" language, one
of the honest things to do, one of the most important may be
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in terms of diligence of your client, is go ask them. If
the company says, "Go talk to my auditor, and ask him why
did you go ’Subject To,'" and the first question is do you
ask those questions? If not, what's this all about, and
if so, what kind of issues do you dredge up by asking
those questions, because to me that will tend to indicate
the value that you're getting out of this "Subject To."
If the only value is that it's drawing
your attention to a particular matter in the footnotes,
I'm not, again, sure there is a heck of a lot of value.
But I'm more interested in what kinds of
answers you get from auditors.
MR. BAKER: I think the inference you are
raising came from part of Bill's observations about
"Subject To" is triggered to do more analysis, and then
a list of all possible sources.
On a personal level I've never found it
very productive to approach auditors, because you never
find out any more than they already have been willing to
say.
On the "Subject To" if it's a litigation
matter it's been more productive to go to an outside counsel
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and try to get some third-party opinion on what the
relevant issues are that are involved in the probabilities
associated with how it's likely to be resolved.
Is that enough?
MR. PREWOZNIK: No, I think that — I've got
to tell you, the auditors must have reasons when they go
"Subject To." I mean they're operating — to the extent
that we have these statistics here, it seems to me when an
auditor writes a "Subject To" opinion if I'm sufficiently
anxious about the implications of it I would pursue why
he's done it.
MR. GRIMMIG: Let me perhaps stick my neck
out again. On two occasions that I've known of — and
I'm not a line officer — on the two occasions that the
line officer went, they are now in litigation.
MR. PREWOZNIK: You've got to give me a
little more than that.
MR. GRIMMIG: Simply that —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I don't think the
auditor is the Plaintiff in these circumstances, is he?
MR. GRIMMIG: No.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I thought I'd point
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that out.
MR. BAILEY: I come back again: It does
strike me that what's coming through is that there is a 
strong belief that somehow the disclosures are inadequate 
and the signal being provided through the "Subject To"
has additional information in it. And if that's true,— and
I don't think some of the auditors believe that that should
be the case, but if that's true, then I'd say that my
personal opinion is that is an inappropriate role for the
auditor to play.
What you're asking for is analysis and
prediction from the. auditor.
Mr. Grimmig's point there is in a sense
that he's looking for an efficiency of search. It leads
to kind of a ranked footnote approach, put the first
important footnote first, the second second. Then you
won't have to read the opinion, just start with your
first footnote and work your way down. That's the
sort of presumption.
I don't think that that analysis and
prediction role is an appropriate role. It doesn't
strike me that the efficiency of search issue is one
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that public accountants ought to be saddled with, in any 
case that the auditing profession ought to be saddled with.
On the other side there seems to be — if
the presumption is that the disclosure is inadequate, 
while they don't want to discuss it here, it strikes me 
that the question is an issue of disclosure, it's an
auditing issue.
I'm basically arguing that I think it is 
an inappropriate role for the auditor to get involved in 
the analysis and prediction issue. If you don't believe
there is an adequate disclosure, it seems to me that there
there is another forum to approach that issue, certainly
not this one.
A related question is do you think that the
auditors — I guess you do think that the auditors with
this additional information are better predictors than
you would be if you analyzed the financial statements as 
a whole, including all of the footnotes, which they presume
to be all-important, otherwise some of them would not be
there.
Do you think the auditors are better
predictors?
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MR. BAKER: I think the question raised is
representative of much of the discussion here this morning. 
It contains a compound presumption, the two parts of which 
involve a non-sequitur. The first issue is does the 
existence of the "Subject To" opinion in the first place
have use to users, and the sum total of all that's been
discussed today comes down to, as I hear it, unanimity on
the part of the users committee that there is some use.
The second is is the use sometimes abuse
or misuse of the information? And I find that not nearly as
germane to the issue of whether or not "Subject To" should
be included or should not be included — should be possible
or not possible.
I think they are separate questions.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Except that that use -
Go ahead, I'm sorry.
MR. KNOWLES: It seems to me that there is
a non-sequitur in your reply, in that I listened to the
comments from CPA's and from the banking community other
than Mr. Grimmig, who had a different use for the thing.
It was that the very premise of your use is being denied
by the people that are preparing the reports. They're
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saying "We understand you use it as a ranking, some place
to go, and so on," but they’re saying it's not, it has not
anything to do with it, so the premise that the user 
community is basing its use upon is wrong.
MR. BAILEY: Either the auditor or —
MR. BAKER: I think it is an inference
there based on an element in the discussion which is not
nearly a complete statement of the possible uses of the
information.
The question is if the "Subject To" opinion
exists will investors use that in some productive fashion,
and I think everybody here has said yes, they’ll find some
use for it.
Some of them have described how they would
use it, and you've said that's a misuse or it's redundant 
or it’s ambiguous, it won't be useful to everybody, and
all that.
I say that's beside the point. Some investor
do find it useful, and they'll find the proper way to use
the information, and that's the criteria by which the
decision should come down as to whether it should continue
or not.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: But I think once you
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say yes, you should use it, you then jump and say that use
is a productive one. We have some concern that you only
believe it's productive — and in fact it shouldn't be —
because you have a misconception as to not just the utility
but what you perceive to be the utility —
MR. BAKER: Well, then let's move to a
region that's never been discussed here today, and I think 
this is a relevant use of it: The business trade press, 
magazines, newspapers or whatever will frequently latch  
on to a "Subject To" and use that as a basis for some
investigative reporting, and some attention will be
directed to an issue that otherwise never would have been
noticed had it been a footnote item fully disclosed but 
not emphasized, and I think that's useful for many
investors in the economy.
MR. MULLARKEY: How do you use it, how do
you bake it into your advice?
MR. BAKER: The "Subject To"?
MR. MULLARKEY: Yes, it's being used, so
we could be more specific as to how it really changes
something. It would be really helpful.
MR. BAKER: To go beyond the question of
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use as a trigger to further analysis I don’t think I can
give you a succinct answer, because there are too many
different ways that your analysis will be led down
different paths to try and understand the issue that's
been called to your attention.
And you don't necessarily do as much
analysis on every single footnote item.
MR. MULLARKEY: Well, the question that
I guess I'm piggybacking on, because I think it's still
open, is the question of going back to management or
going to the auditor to gather additional information which
was stated, or if that doesn't happen with the use of the
"Subject To" what exact use do you make of it?
MR. KEALY: You go to all of the above and
perhaps some others. I mean I agree with Dave's comment
that often the auditor that prepared the statement that
included the "Subject To" opinion is the least productive
line of inquiry. I can't cite specific chapter and verse
of specific issues, but I know that in general that is
another presumption.
MR. MULLARKEY: So what do you get out of
management?
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MR. KEALY: So we'll go back to the
management on that issue, use our own auditors, not
necessarily the auditor that prepared the statement,
and ask them what's going on.
If it's a litigious matter we might go
to our law firm, not their law firm, and we may not get
more information but we believe the process of due diligence
has been exercised by going through that loop ourselves.
And I doubt — I really do also strongly wish to raise 
issue with the inference that all we're doing here is
seeking some prioritizing of footnotes and that we're
trying to make our jobs easier.
That's kind of not fair. I mean it is
something that we'll get to on Monday instead of Tuesday,
but we're going to get to everybody in the process of
looking at the security. I mean it's not — I don't want
the inference to be left on the table that all we do is
look at those items where there has been a "Subject To"
opinion or we look at that, you know, 50 times more
carefully than anything else.
MR. LANDSITTEL: We do have to stop.
MR. MULLARKEY: But we are still looking
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at his question.
MR. KEALY: We go to the management, we
go to the auditors in question, and get most often very- 
little. We go to auditors and ask why might this have 
occurred, what light could you shed on it, and we go to
counsel, if it's a litigious matter.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Have you ever found anything
in your own inquiries that led you to or your own auditor
to conclude that the material in those financial statements
was materially inadequate or unfair?
MR. KEALY: I am trying to stay away from
the disclosure question per se. I am trying to —
MR. PREWOZNIK: I am talking about user
information. I mean that's a functional question in terms
of what's fair for disclosure in financial statements. I
am saying have you ever found anything that you felt
should have been in that note and wasn't?
MR. SAMPSON: We have.
MR. PREWOZNIK: That was my next question,
does the SEC ask questions when they see "Subject To"?
MR. SAMPSON: We ask questions of the company,
not of the auditor, and we have found situations where the
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disclosure was inadequate. Might have been triggered by
the auditor himself.
But in selective review we use that "Subject
To" as perhaps something we should look at to see if the
disclosure is adequate.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Did you ever find one,
though, a case where the footnote was not also inadequate
where there was a "Subject To" and you followed up and
found out that it was, you know —
MR. SAMPSON: I'm not sure I followed
your question.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Well, you said that you
weren't sure whether when you followed up on these "Subject
To's" and you thought that there should be additional
information — the question is would you have made that
followup without the "Subject To"?
I mean, if you had read the footnote.
MR. SAMPSON: The answer would generally be
yes, if we had sufficient manpower.
MR. HODGES: The question is sometimes —
MR. PREWOZNIK: Well, you're using the
auditors then or the manpower of the government to help
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you.
MR. GREENE: Wait a minute. I would like to
respond. There is not this compartment between auditing and 
accounting, they're related. And there is a real problem
with 5. We have expressed our view about that. I've
suggested there are problems, and it's a heavy problem.
The question is should the Commission go forward with the
change. It's a question of who has the burden, and it's
not a question of the government sort »of inventing the
system. It's there.
We find it very helpful, we find it basically
helps the quality disclosure, because of the Draconian
consequences you simply cannot finance in the market, and 
if our overall objective is an equal disclosure, we I think
are relatively satisfied with the result, given the
tension between auditing and accounting standards, and I
think if you don't change 5 then I think it's hard to change
this system, because I think to me they are inextricably
related.
MR. PREWOZNIK: You said the Commission has
problems with 5?
MR. GREENE: Sure.
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MR. PREWOZNIK: In this area here what is a
key problem that the Commission has?
MR. GREENE: I think one of the key problems
— go ahead.
MR. SAMPSON: There are different views on
the staff as to 5. There are some people on staff that
think there is some problem with 5, moreso than perhaps I
might. I think you can amend 5 and probably improve it,
but I don’t think you can amend it in a way which will take
care of its problems. You simply can’t write a standard
which will result in adequate disclosure.
MR. THOMPSON: Have you talked to the FASB
about amending 5, and what was their reaction?
MR. SAMPSON: I don’t know, we’ve talked to
the FASB at times about 5, and the thing that Ed is
referring to is a recent report, and I don't believe there
has been any expansive discussion since that report.
Certain staff members believe it should be
pushed much harder than I personally do. I don't see the
severe deficiencies involved. That is not to say that the
disclosures that come about as a result of 5 and its
interpretation are always good, they're not.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: When you say the
disclosure is not always deficient, deficient in accordance
with 5, or is it the question that you believe it should
go beyond 5?
MR. SAMPSON: No, no, in accordance with 5.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: So you're saying that
the auditors gave an inappropriate opinion because it
sure should have been "Subject To," it should have been
"Except For"? *
MR. SAMPSON: That would have been the
logical question.
MR. J.T. BALL: Our discussions with the
Commission since 5 has been issued have typically been
that the disclosures required by 5 and by Interpretation
14 were not being given, not that the disclosures required
by 5 and 14 were in some way deficient.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Well —
MR. MULLARKEY: I’m just going to make a
point here because — I mean the point that I want to make
is a simple point that we eventually have to go to lunch
if we have to come back at one. But I don't want to cut
the discussion off if you think we can finish it off, then
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don't feel it to be a strong
MR. PREWOZNIK
go to lunch.
So you get five more minutes and then go to
lunch.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I have an instinct that
somehow if the user of "Subject To" is the tip of an
iceberg in some cases, it seems to me this is a view we’ve 
expressed in our own small ad hoc group in the ABA, and 
isn’t it possibly true that if you removed that "Subject 
To" gimmick that you will encourage those who would
otherwise have used it as somehow a mechanic to avoid
facing up to the disclosure, in fact that you would 
thereby eliminate that and then they will be forced — the
issuers, the lawyers and the auditors — to apply themselves
to the only source that they can comply with, which is the
GAAP disclosure in accordance with FAS 5.
That’s the assertion.
Isn’t it a possibility?
It's a possibility, but I
possibility.
How about remote, and so on
and so forth?
MR. SAMPSON:
MR. PREWOZNIK
MR. SAMPSON:
MR. KINNEY: Reasonably possible?
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MR. MULLARKEY: Okay, I'm not going to take
any of the questions.
Let me just say something about lunch.
Lunch is upstairs, and it's for everyone
we knew were coming, so it's for everybody at the table
and all the advisors they told us were coming, but we
didn't plan for everybody.
We are going to reconvene at 1:00.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Including advisory
personnel who we knew were coming?
MR. MULLARKEY: That's correct.
Well, you probably know better than I do if
you were coming.
(Whereupon, at 12:20 P.M., a luncheon
recess was taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
1:00 P.M.
MR. MULLARKEY: Okay, we’re going to
discuss at this time what we mentioned earlier. We’ve
never gotten to it yet, but we would like to focus in
distinguishing the public environment from other environ­
ments . We did say we wanted to stress that, see if it
might be different, get some comments, and I think we might
start off with the governmental environment and then work
down to the pure environments.
MR. FAULS: You aren’t inferring they are
impure, are you?
MR. BROADUS: I’m not sure that the
problems are any different really, but in that light let me
back up and tie a couple things in — I think they apply
to government as well as the private sector.
You know if anybody is for disclosure it's
probably the governmental people. We may overdo it. And
you know, going back to FAS 2, in my opinion at least, in
part that helped the field with some disclosure that wasn’t
in the accounting field, and since then FAS 5, whether it
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does not do enough, we need not debate that, I think we
could debate that the rest of the day.
So then why do we continue with that
subject?
Let me say I can't give you a research report,
I can only say in my working with state and local affairs
for about ten years, and CPA's, I'm not sure that the
auditors clearly understand what a "Subject To" opinion
happens to be.
I within the last week met with two different
groups of auditors, the same circumstances, one would have
had a "Subject To," one would have had "Except For," using
the same FAS.
I suspect that all around the room you get the
same thing, and I'm talking about a wide span there, not
a close one,— we've always got the judgmental type thing
there.
I heard a lot of that come out today that
even auditors may be giving different things when they
say "Subject To."
On the other side the recipients, the
users of those "Subject To" opinions, certainly look at it
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from a different view. One thing says it's an opinion, a 
projection? one says its nothing more than "Look at Page 6." 
A wide range.
When you've got both the auditors and the
users not really knowing what "Subject To" says, you've
got some problems, you've got some stuff thrown in a big
barrel.
I think there are two options. I don't
think that in GAO,General Accounting Office, we'd have any
problem doing away with "Subject To." And I think you
could argue the case both ways, take it either side and
win, because there are good arguments on both sides.
But I think we certainly would support doing
away with it.
Also if it remains I think we'd support that
you'd have to set forth criteria so that the auditors
would have better information on what they're supposed to
do when they issue that thing, and also on the other side
the users of that must know what we're coming through
with forthwith.
So I think if we keep that, all right. If
we do away with it, then I'm not sure what would happen.
119
I don’t see the problems being much different in the
governmental sector, state, local and federal.
I do know because in government, especially
state and local, that we have some more serious problems
and we need to go farther in this area, I think in the area
of going in accordance with GAAP, it may be that they aren’t 
even following GAAP, so that may be another situation.
Not even all states and localities today are required to
follow GAAP, and it may be a long time before they are
required, so we have got a lot of problems.
We don’t have the same problems with
"Subject To" that the private sector has.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: How about private
companies? Is there literally a distinction, or are the
issues any different from the lending officers' standpoint
when you're dealing with the public company rather than a
non-public?
MR. GRIMMIG: Say that again, please.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We know, or we
discussed the elimination or non-elimination of the "Subject
To" and the perceived utility of it or lack of utility of
"Subject To," but do the issues change or do your opinions
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change when you’re dealing with a private company evironment
as opposed to the public company environment?
MR. GRIMMIG: I think not.
MR. WATTERSTON: I think not. I don’t think
there is any difference really between public and private
companies, and that goes right down through the auditor’s
report, the accounting principles and the other standards
that are set, because we're looking at balance sheets,
income statements and the rest, and it doesn't matter how
many shareholders they have.
MR. GRIMMIG: I think there may be a slight
difference because a public company that's represented on
one of the stock exchanges that has filing requirements with
the SEC has probably one of the Big 8 auditing it. The
tendency is, I guess, to give them a little benefit of the
doubt compared to the non-public company that doesn't have
the checks and balances perhaps of an SEC filing requirement
or perhaps not one of the Big 8, not even one of the Big
200, on it.
So I think there is probably more of a
harder look, perhaps, at a non-public company.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Would you consider
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in Canada making a distinction between public and non-public
MR. KNOWLES: No, we feel that in the
raising of capital with the non-public companies a banker 
probably has a more intimate knowledge of the actual
operation and personnel and is better equipped to make 
a judgment than with the public companies in many instances,
because of the intimate knowledge he has of the affairs of
the particular issue.
So that was not a concern with us.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: The fact that the
uncertainty changes there, would that make a difference?
Most of the "Subject To’s" in the non-public environment
are over continued asset realization and continued existence
circumstances. At least we think that's the case.
As opposed to litigation. Does the nature
of the uncertainty cause you to feel differently?
MR. WATTERSTON: I don't know. I mean you
think that these "Subject To's" are different for private
companies, or do we have some statistics that we can look
at?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think we don't have
statistics because it's tough to retrieve, Jim. It's more
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Board members’ perceptions that when they're dealing in 
the private environment the incidence of "Subject To" is 
more often — the reason for it is more often the going 
concern issue as opposed to litigation, which appears to
be the most common one in the public environment.
MR. MULLARKEY: Yes?
MR. GREENE: I think there may be a
de facto situation between public and private. Unless
the Commission is prepared to accept "Except For" filings
I don't think it's an alternative for a publicly-held
company. So that you say that's an option for an auditor,
but that in a sense puts the public company out of business
for all intents and purposes, and I am not sure whether —
that has come up from time to time — as to what your
requirements for financing under the 1933 Act and the Act of
1934 are, but that's a problem because that's a factor
that comes to bear on judgments that are to be made.
They can't ignore that.
I don't know how the Commission adjusts
that, whether in Canada the Commission has restrictions
on the kinds of financial statements that can be used to
advance
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MR. KNOWLES: Our restriction is that the
accounting GAAP is the law, and you break the law if you
don’t make your statements in accordance with GAAP. I
would have no trouble authorizing a financing if there
was a legitimate reason for not complying with GAAP in a
particular instance.
MR. GREENE: Have you done that before?
MR. KNOWLES: No, we've had it come up a
couple of times, but they backed away from it.
But I would think you could find situations
particularly in the area of Mega projects, where perhaps
GAAP might not be considered to present fairly the
financial situation, and that we had talked about it in
one of our cases, the Seagram's case, that there is an
overriding consideration in the Ontario, in the Canadian
handbook that says that the auditor's first duty is to
ensure that the auditor's statements present fairly the
financial position, and if he's prepared to go on and say
that GAAP won't do that, then we rely on that.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I was just going to say, Ed,
that I don't see that the elimination of "Subject To" would
compromise the financial requirement aspects of the 1933 Act
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particularly because the "Subject To" if it is used —
even now the reason that it's permitted is because it's
not based on a departure from GAAP or a limitation on
scope, and the proposal contemplates that that distinction
would be preserved, so to the extent that elimination of
the "Subject To" assumed that the financials will continue
to present in accordance to GAAP and that there will be
no limitation on scope, I don't think you should assume
an invitation to the use of "Except For's" in place of
"Subject To's" because the proposal as I read it expressly
addresses that issue and says that that will not happen,
it should not happen and will not happen.
And you should have no additional scope
limits or non-GAAP problems after this is adopted than
you would now.
So we considered this issue in our little
ad hoc group and we felt that that's absolutely the case.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Tom, you represent a
non-public company, or your constitutents include that.
Do you see a need for us to try to make a distinction?
MR. FAULS: They see no logical distinction
between the two. They felt, private companies and the very
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small public companies feel that they are more likely to
be caught up in the "Subject To" environment — the private
companies particularly — for reasons of growing concern,
perhaps, because they are small, they are new, they are
entrepreneurial and they are probably more risky than
Fortune 500 companies.
You may argue that point these days, but
at least their perception is that they are in a region that is
likely to be more affected by whatever the Board decides to
do than the larger companies.
There will be more of them.
But they don’t see any reason, at least 
the ones I’ve talked to don't see any reason to distinguish
between the two in making a decision.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Does the Commission
have any statistics on whether there are more "Subject To"
opinions given for small registrants as opposed to large,
or however you want to define small and large, Clarence?
MR. HODGES: Well, we get some statistics
out of Compustat, and I will tell you the numbers we have
include a few things that maybe they shouldn’t, but I think
the numbers are maybe about ten percent, whereas, I think
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you have something like six percent here and what, 60 0
companies? I think there are a few things.
Ten percent may be slightly high. Overall
of a population of about 9,000 companies it’s ten percent.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Any higher correlation
for smaller companies?
MR. HODGES: This includes 9,000, and
obviously if you get above 600 you get a lot of small
companies in it, so it must indicate a heavier number
on the smaller companies.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I see what you mean.
Anyone else want to address this private — 
MR. JONES: Before you leave the governmental
area I'd like to express to you the feelings of the
Financial Council. Basically they handle problems of 
"Subject To" opinions for lost contingencies.
They feel that the guidance provided under
FAS Statement Number 5 and Statement Number 4, which was
recently adopted, which provided for guidance for applying,
whereas FAS Statement Number 5 is to government entities,
provide enough guidance for the fair presentation of
financial statements on governmental entities.
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They did have some problems with doing
away with emphasis on the matter paragraph, and if there 
is a problem which may be somewhat unique to government 
interests in those circumstances whereby an entity or a 
governmental entity may not have sufficient funding to meet
the requirements of a bond issue.
The accounting principles currently do not
provide guidance for disclosure of that occurrence, and
for that reason they're somewhat reluctant to do away with
it.
They feel now that governments or the audits
of governmental entities are using that paragraph or that
mechanism to disclose circumstances where they feel that a
governmental entity, and particularly New York is the
example that they use, is not going to be able to or
possibly — and I'm not going to say without a doubt —
but possibly could not meet their bond requirements.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Reserve requirements
or cash?
MR. JONES: Well, cash requirements for
bonds.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: All right, Clarence,
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you’ve had some objections to the conclusion to eliminate 
the emphasis of the matter paragraph I think also.
MR. SAMPSON: Well, that's true, but
you start without objections to doing away with "Subject
To."
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I thought you were
convinced that was all right.
MR. SAMPSON: Oh, you did?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: It seemed obvious to
me.
MR. SAMPSON: No, you have not convinced me
that I should rush home and write a note asking to do away 
with the provision "Subject To."
If you did reach a conclusion that you
should do away with "Subject To" — and I personally don't 
think the record today leads you to that conclusion — I
would still have some trouble if the Board was to undertake
to tell auditors under no circumstances that they were to
render a clean opinion for an "Except For" and nothing
in between. If an auditor felt the need to say something
else I don't see that the Board should try to prevent that.
MR. LANDSITTEL: There might be a fine line,
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but I don’t think it's intended that any emphasis of the 
matter paragraph for any reason would be prohibitive, if 
you attempt to say that it shouldn’t be used as a surrogate 
for disclosure of an uncertainty that would have otherwise 
been a "Subject To" audit opinion.
MR. SAMPSON: One of the things that was
referred to earlier today that I thought about a bit,
a situation where the attorneys and the company agreed
that they’re going to lose their litigation, they don’t
know what it’s going to cost them, and if they can
successfully assert a minimum, even though they have
provided anything, but it's a material amount, I have a
difficult time seeing how an accountant would be able to
give a clean opinion no matter what the disclosure was
if he knows this company’s financial statements do not
include a liability or a charge against income which was
certain to occur in their view.
I have very much of a very big problem
with a clean opinion in those circumstances.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Apart from the emphasis
of the matter paragraph?
MR. SAMPSON: I’m not challenging GAAP, but
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there needs to be some emphasis, whether it's an emphasis 
paragraph or "Subject To" or call it what you will.
If I were an auditor I sure as heck would
call people's attention to that.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: You understand our
not really argument but our decision at least on that, so
that if you have eliminated the qualification you don't
want some other manifestation of the same requirements —
MR. SAMPSON: I understand it entirely.
MR. BAILEY: Clarence, why wouldn't footnote
disclosure be sufficient?
MR. SAMPSON: Because you' re expected to
call their attention to something that's such an important
thing in looking at this company.
MR. BAILEY: Is it a reasonable expectation?
Perhaps we ought to change their expectations.
MR. SAMPSON: I don't think anything today
has indicated that you are in the process of changing them.
It may be over a period of time.
MR. BAILEY: It may be chickens and eggs.
If they don't make the suggestion they may never be —
MR. SAMPSON: What's the cost of continuing
131
the "Subject To”? The only real cost that I’ve heard 
expressed is the potential misuse of it.
And I’ve seen some of it and some misuse of,
perhaps today, but not sufficiently strong that it leads me 
to conclude that it’s a major cost and not to be given 
any great weight in looking at the question.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think there are a
couple of potential costs that we have not discussed
today because we weren’t intending to go through everything
in the issues paper, but we never did address the
implication that some people believe that you've emphasized
this matter by qualifying your opinion, therefore prioriti­
zing the footnotes, saying, "Don't forget to read this one.
Is that an implication that everything else that is in
170 footnotes is of less importance, including perhaps the
very significant disclosures of discontinued operations
and some other things that don't have anything about
contingencies?
That's one cost perhaps of keeping it,
that it draws attention to things that might not necessarily 
be more significant,whatever significant means, but the
literature happens to require you to draw attention to
that particular type of item, and that the other is the
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implication that absent the "Subject To" opinion is it 
significant — or rather is it true that no significant 
uncertainties exist, and I think that’s a very real 
possibility today, that people could believe that, and
that to me is a very — that's a distinct type of cost
because it's not true.
MR. SAMPSON: I guess what I thought I heard
more clearly was we've got this one red flag in place, and
just because it's imperfect doesn't mean we don't like to
have it, we think it's useful, and please don't take it
away from us because you don't know how to deal with
other kinds of red flag that also might be important.
MR.KNOWLES: I would think, Clarence, that
there is a very real cost beyond that, and none of us have
the statistics, but they could I guess be gathered. There 
is a cost of manpower. How much does it take of your
manpower to persuade the bankers or underwriters to take
your issue forward to the public if you've got a
qualification on it? Presently in Canada what's looked on
as a form of qualified opinion rather than a comment
directed to the particular note is what obtains, and what
I heard people say today is that they rely heavily on the
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"Subject To" qualification on the premise that it
prioritizes the importance of the notes, and I thought I 
heard the other side of the table say that’s an incorrect
premise.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, it is an incorrect
premise, to be sure. In certain environments no one is
assessing what is more important to disclose or less
important, really.
MR. FAULS: Why would a "Subject To" ever
be used?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Because the literature
requires you to for uncertainties. It doesn’t require
you to at the moment, inappropriately, so in our belief
it’s a holdover from when disclosure requirements were
different than they are today, but that doesn’t mean
that in all of the items disclosed in these financial
statements the auditors conclude that’s the most important
thing to point out to someone.
MR. FAULS: But might it be of a different
character than the other footnote?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: It is. It concerns
uncertainty.
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MR. WATTERSTON: And it's a potential
material adjustment to the financial statement.
Of course I said that probably too many 
times. Of course I said that too many times, and I guess 
I understand, you know, where you're coming from, and I
could probably argue from the other side, but I still —
you know, you've got significant opposition to this change,
and I'd just like to add to the literature or the statistical
surveys that were referred to before.
I took a survey this past week at my bank.
Fifty-one loan officers and credit analysts responded.
Forty-three were against eliminating this "Subject To,"
eight were for it.
The 43 that were against, you know, all the
same sort of answers you've heard today: It encourages
greater auditors' care, it encourages greater user care,
it helps the unsophisticated investor, that the auditor
is the closest and the most impartial viewer, and we
expect this from him, and the material adjustment should be
noted.
Now, the people that are for the
elimination — and this is interesting — one says that it
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believes that it would encourage more disclosure but the 
seven others think that it favors the sophisticated
investor, and one of my people said, "I favor anything 
that makes the lender's job more difficult."
It favors the lender because it means that
other people can't do the lender's job, and if you want to 
just say that the most sophisticated people, then you can
eliminate this thing.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, I won't even
talk to you about the sophistication of your sample or
anything else. You've drawn very sweeping conclusions
from that, but I guess —
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, you can't draw
sweeping conclusions, but one conclusion I come to is
that there is tremendous opposition to this.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: But Jim, let's
examine why. I think we have to come to that. And it is
perhaps the very issue that we've been discussing, but
doesn't it strike you as a little troublesome that the
user group tell us this has use and utility and we use
it, though I agree I believe with Mr. Knowles they have
not articulated at all how they use it other than as an
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indicator that they should be more diligent, that they 
should be more diligent in their work, but when you get 
through with your assumptions about how it's useful and 
what you think it does — and I would certainly go through 
the 40 that you said voted against elimination there — by
and large the absolute opposite conclusion to what the
users are drawing is what the auditors are drawing, and
they are the ones that in fact, probably at least, know
the circumstances under which they're giving this opinion.
So that it really fundamentally bothers me
that you believe that you're getting something that we're
in fact not delivering, don't intend to deliver, probably
don't believe we can deliver, and yet even though you
aren't getting what you think you are, you still think it's
useful.
And I really — that to me becomes the
bottom line.
Clarence says that we have not certainly
built a track record that you don't think it's useful, and
I agree with that, you all believe it is. You've built a
pretty good track record to me and my concerns are legitimate.
You only believe it is, but you should not
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believe it is, not for the reasons you've indicated, so
we feel really I think it comes back to almost the same
capacity, but it concerns me that the users aren't concerned,
they say "I still want this even though it isn't at all
what I think it is from what you're telling me," and that's
what we've done for four hours.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Has anybody done an
analysis of the statistical tables in "Subject To" to
analyze what was the nature of the uncertainty to which
"Subject To" was referenced since FAS 5 went into effect,
post-FAS 5 "Subject To"?
I think if that hadn't been done that
would be something which I would be very much interested
in. That would tend to tell you when and why auditors
might be calling attention to —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: It's litigation.
MR. MULLARKEY: More than the general
category?
MR. PREWOZNIK: It's not all litigation,
though. In other words, there are lines being drawn, are
there not?
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Yes.
MR. PREWOZNIK: You don’t have "Subject To’s” 
referring to every bit of litigation.
So the question is —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: No, no.
MR. PREWOZNIK: — What kinds of litigation
draw the flies? To me that's interesting because it at
least gives you some idea of what the profession has been 
doing since FAS 5 went into effect and gives you some 
idea of what they're thinking about when they're doing it.
In other words, a case could be made that
as soon as FAS 5 came into effect some kind of switch,
some criteria came into play and are being applied, however
informally, but this kind of a survey it seems to me
would reveal how these choices are being made by what is
referred to by "Subject To" and what isn't.
Because all things are not being referred to.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, I think we
all have some presumption that it’s litigation, and it
also happens to be the kind of litigation where the
ability to predict the amount of liability, if any, is
admittedly extremely difficult but known to be large.
139
Now, that tends to be —
MR. HODGES: Doesn’t it go beyond just
known to be large? Somebody mentioned Robbins here today, 
which is a small company, probably got a good earnings 
record, if you believe the income statements as they 
stand, but if they have to pick up the tab for some of
the suits that are pending against them now it could be
absolutely devastating. And therefore those statements
are absolutely irrelevant.
On the other hand their insurance company
may pick up enough of the tab that this doesn't hurt
at all.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Do the disclosures in the
footnotes articulate that problem?
MR. HODGES: Okay, these people tell us
that —
A SPEAKER: Yes, they do.
MR. HODGES: These people tell us it's
something of unusual pervasiveness, not just because it's
big but the snowball effects that go with this material.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I also wanted to mention
on Clarence's point there that even if it's concluded that
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a negative outcome is probable you can have a case where
the estimated loss barely meets the minimum threshhold of
materiality. Do you follow me?
It’s a sure loser, but we're going to beat
the hell out of them on the damages. I don't see why
that would have to be flagged by a "Subject To."
So I'm simply pointing out, Clarence, that
all probable litigation doesn't necessarily rise to the
level of having to go to "Subject To" because there is a
second switch to check.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Did anyone react to
my characterization of what we've done today in terms of
discussion that we've discussed the issue we were asked to
discuss but by and large ended up with a difference in 
perception as to whether the people that see this as
having utility are entitled to that perception? Am I
wrong in believing that, do you think, or am I the only
one that thinks that?
MR. PREWOZNIK: I think that — my — I
think we're on the same frequency, that the perception
is based obviously in good faith on a misunderstanding
of what the literature presently says about when the
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"Subject To" comes into play.
And the problem is the literature should
not be calling for a "Subject To."
That's the real problem. It's just an
anachronism.
MR. BAILEY: I would agree, and more than that,
there is no reason for them to change their perception
here because there is not cost to them. The way they use
the information is to soreen and alter their research
process and then give advice for a decision with respect
to lending and financing.
The errors they would make with those
signals would keep them from doing something, and they
would do something else, and they'll never get an assessment
of what might have been if they had taken a different
approach. There is no cost in their decision-making
process. The cost lies elsewhere with the person who
makes the decision subject to or the auditor who renders
it, and so they have no reason to change their opinions
either, these groups.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We accept them as
representative of user groups, too.
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MR. BAILEY: These user groups have no
reason to change their decision, so I don’t think you can
argue them out of it.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That seems to be
a conclusion I can agree with.
MR. CARMICHAEL: Well, we didn't come here
to argue, we came to gather information.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Paul.
MR. WYCISKALA: I think one of the points
here is that we have a communication problem, a lack of
understanding on the part of the auditors of what the
users want and the users what the auditors are saying.
But I think one thing we can overcome —
you know, in the discussions today we unfortunately won't
be able to bring Mr. average investor in, but I don't like
to see the uses,1 and the reasons for uses dismissed out of
hand because unfortunately we didn't set any ground rules
nor have we ever published why or how the user should use
it, so I think it's adequate to say that there are users.
Okay, traditionally we have required that
a copy of the auditor’s report be included in the annual
reports. Over time the security industry analysts and
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others have set about on a task trying to educate the
readers to use such things as the auditors' reports.
We've had auditors' reports used for a long
period of time for a diversity of purposes, but nevertheless
we have brought the public, even though they may be not
using it exactly the way we would like it, but they have
been finding it useful.
So far the discussions have also basically
dwelt solely on litigation. Litigation is only one of many
uncertainties, and we haven't really broken open the
iceberg yet on the question of uncertainties in severs1 
areas that lead to a question about the company's ability 
to continue as a going concern, and I think that if the
action that is proposed here today is moved forward we're
going to find a situation where less is going to be more,
eliminating the emphasis paragraph and the "Subject To"
is less but the more it is going to create is more disclosure
that is going to be understood by fewer people.
We may have a more litigious environment,
and I am just concerned that the less is going to turn out
to be more, especially when we come to going concern
situations.
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MR. LANDSITTEL: How do you conclude it
would be a more litigious environment?
MR. WYCISKALA: To make the quantum jump
and say, "From here on out as long as there is adequate
disclosure there is nothing" I think is going to be such
a shock wave to the people that need and use and rely on
it now that, you know, possibly the actions may not be 
to anything, but I think it’s going to bring in question 
whether stepping aside from what has traditionally been
done and a rule that is perceived to have served the .
public interest is a stepping away and abrogation of. the
professional responsibility.
I think that's where the issue is going
to come out.
MR. LANDSITTEL: It is a very interesting
observation to have focused on litigation. What are
the differences in the pros and cons for a going concern
issue vis-a-vis the litigation issue in your mind? I mean
would the same pros and cons carry over or are there
different issues that should be pretty sharply identified?
MR. WYCISKALA: In my opinion the question
of the going concern, since it goes to the whole heart of
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what the financial statements present and the whole basis
of GAAP, I think that is such a pervasive issue that at
least it would have to be separated from removing the
"Subject To" or other matters.
Maybe there should be some definition on
the situations in which a "Subject To" should be given.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, I'd like to
hear more people discuss that just so that we all understand
we have not made a distinction in the proposal between
"Subject To" opinions with respect to continued existence,
which you consider to be a realization, asset realization
on classification of liabilities issue and other forms of
at all. They've all been considered the same.
I think the principal reason for that is
to separate litigation from the going concern
as what's being litigated is a big enough
contingencies
the inability
issue as long
number.
MR. WYCISKALA: Well, that's part of my
concern, because again, disclosure in Footnote 2 of
possible, you know, technical defaults where the company 
is continuing on waivers, a situation in Footnote Number 5
that may address litigation, and another section on
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contingencies, maybe some regulatory actions have been 
brought, each one of them standing alone being read
separately may not necessarily all be bridged to give
appropriate highlights that, you know, when you put them
all together you’ve got a question of the going concern,
and that is the basis that I think the "Subject To"
opinion, especially where going concern matters are 
involved, has been served extremely well by the "Subject To" 
opinions.
MR. GREENE: Let me just elaborate on that,
because some of the things "Subject To" does, it does give 
emphasis. And people say, "Well, you shouldn't do that, 
once it goes to the totality of the financial statement."
But there is another pervasive policy in the law saying it
may not be enough just to put the facts here and there,
it's not enough to point to the facts and say, "They're 
all there if you look for them," there are some facts you
have to emphasize and put them all there for the reader,
and I think it exists not so much in the accounting as the
disclosure area.
There is a strong sense that others looking
at it say that "Well, maybe you understood it by putting
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it all together, but it should have been presented all 
differently," but perhaps emphasis is not a bad value with
respect to some users.
Maybe from your point you’re emphasizing 
the wrong things, but that may suggest opening up more 
ways of emphasizing rather than saying,"We’re emphasizing
nothing," and turning back to the footnotes.
If you read these footnotes, they don’t
give you the sense of what’s going on as much as disclosure
in other forms. You’re asking that to bear a lot of
judgment that Other ways of presenting information are
perhaps more helpful.
MR. MULLARKEY: That’s a very serious
statement, isn't it, that the footnotes do not present
information people need.
MR. GREENE: I'm just saying there are
various values, and people struggle with what's the best
way to present it and how does it come through, and so
forth. I don't think there is any agreement about how
you communicate to various users your presentation. Indeed
we are struggling with that in a variety of ways, but
there are some cases where it may not simply be enough to
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rely on disclosure; in fact I would suspect that in some
context people would not rely totally on that but would
want to emphasize it in different ways.
MR. WYCISKALA: In terms of the shareholders,
not the users of the annual report, something like 10K,
you know, I think the real problem is earlier on one of
the premises we were looking at the knowledgeable user
of the financial statement; well, after about 24 years 
various dealings with accountants' reports and so forth I
find that day by day I am finding it more difficult to
read the footnotes, so I think that possibly the next step
we’re talking about is further reducing those that would be
able to understand and make use of the financial statements
in their totality without — call it expanded disclosure,
I don't like to call it applied, expanded disclosure that
we presently have.
MR. LANDSITTEL: My view and that of a
number of partners in my firm, we can understand the
benefit of an emphasis, but again, it gets into what
the proper auditor really is doing, and it's very hard
to determine where you — or you get very uneasy with
the determination that the auditor is smart enough to
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know what should be emphasized and what shouldn't be 
emphasized, and you can say "Well, pervasiveness is a key 
and going concern is the most pervasive," but even so we
get into situations under the present framework where I
can see a client's frustration when they come to us and
they say,"Well, why are you giving a 'Subject To' opinion,
are the measurement standards applied wrong?"
"No. "
"Are the disclosure standards wrong?"
"We'll disclose whatever you want us to
disclose."
"Fine. Are the statements going to change?"
"No, these particular statements won't
later change."
"Then what makes you, auditor, so smart
that you then have to go on and apply some other criteria
to suggest that you read the future in a way, re going
concern or whatever the uncertainty, in a way that you
have to assume an additional responsibility that we can't
meet because it's impossible for us to meet them in terms
of the financial statements?"
And I think that's a very frustrating
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problem with the concept of the emphasis, whether it's in 
a paragraph or a qualified opinion. That makes me uneasy 
in terms of the auditor role that I think Henry this 
morning articulated.
MR. KNOWLES: I’d like to pick up on that 
on Edward’s point. It seems to me that if you take the 
point that you just made, on your point, you’re trying to 
make a five-legged elephant. The financial statements
are prepared by management and are reported upon by the 
auditor in terms of whether they comply with GAAP or don't 
comply with it. Now you're asking them to do two things:
You're asking them to emphasize or do a mini-analysis of
what the statements mean, which is the duty of the
financial analyst or other person who analyzes the
statement, and you're also asking them to put a qualitative
judgment on the financial position of the corporation, and
I don't think the auditor is either trained or qualified to
do that.
He can put the standard judgment on the
financial statements that they've met the standards, but
then when you switch across to either disclosure from
the prospectus frame of reference or to quantitative or
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qualitative analysis, you must go to the analyst or the 
other person whose business that is, and if you’re thinking 
of disclosure in the context of a prospectus, stop and
think who is liable in a prospectus, and that’s all the 
people who have touched the thing along the way, and if 
you impose that type of duty on the accounting profession 
then they’re going to become liable for non-disclosure in 
their audit opinion themselves, which opens up a whole
new cost factor because their fees will go up and insurance 
premiums will go up, so they won’t get to reap the benefits
of the increased fees. But I think this is too much across
the lines to try and construct the one perfect thing with
one body.
MR. GREENE: I start from a totally different
premise. We have a system now where basically we have an
audit report which has a "Subject To."
The argument is made because of the change
in accounting standards, because of contingency there is
no need to have a report that grew up before the standards
were there, and that the standards being sound, therefore
the report should change, and I think — from our
perspective I don't think the case has been carried.
And to the extent that users and others find
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this emphasis useful, why should they be told, "Well, tough, 
you’re using it the wrong way because of the change in the
auditing standards."
And that’s the fundamental argument. I
think you’re exactly right, the standards have now changed.
Now we can have an auditing report commensurate with the
new standards. And that's I think a very — that's a judgment
call, and it's a very close question.
I mean we in a sense inherited the system,
and now we're going totally to take a change from it
because of your perception that we don't understand what 
you're about to be doing.
MR. MULLARKEY: That's not quite right.
You didn't inherit the system as much as the system existed,
and then the standards caught up with it.
MR. GREENE: That's fair.
MR. MULLARKEY: And now it's no longer
necessary but it's being retained by people who don't
understand it, and they're going to use it, and the lack of  
burden as to whether they're going to use it means whether 
they understand what they're using. It's every difficult
to use something effectively if you don't understand what
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it is that you're using.
It also focuses attention on one area at
the expense of another. Putting some of these comments,
what has been said, that if we eliminate the "Subject To"
more information would go in the footnotes, I think that's
what Ed said. And that was less information for the investor
to read.
I mean if we have a fundamental problem —■
and we're all in the public interest here — if the fundamen­
tal problem is that financial statements can't be understood,
then the retention of the auditor's subjective opinion is
not the answer as much as the distraction over the issue,
whatever the issue is, and we've got this holdover of the
people who are investing, meaning to invest, as different
from the people who are issuing them, and they are dazzling
themselves, so the cost is to leave something out which
could be misleading in the way people use it because they
use it differently than the way it's developed and ignore
the problem.
MR. GREENE: I wish the group hadn't left
here, but I don't think they — You suggested they
emphasize that and the other information not seen in this
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report. I think they say they begin to look at a company, 
they look at everything. I don’t think they say they look 
at the footnotes, to the "Subject To" and treat it at a
higher level.
I think they’re saying they use it in a
way of generating a fact about a company, some of which is
general —
MR. MULLARKEY: But in the mosaic one thing
they developed was looking at it today and tomorrow. And
they're sophisticated users of financial statements, and
when we talk about the public interest it includes all
users. I don't think we can expect all users to be as
knowledgeable about all these differences, and this only
focuses on one narrow area when the auditors' role is to make
sure that the information is useable rather than to interpret
one piece of the information when the users aren't inter­
preting the way we are.
I think it's a very serious issue, and it's
not an issue of taking away something that legitimately is
not disclosed in the footnotes, because if that is so then
we should change whatever the standards are that require
management to disclose items.
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It is this shadow role that's misunderstood
either by the people who issue these or by the people who
use them, because there is a difference, and I don't think
we can just because it exists then therefore say it is no
cost or it’s not wrong if we can’t figure out why it has
utility.
MR. BAILEY: Suppose you take the approach of
"We don't have it." Some of us wouldn't agree, by the way,
that just because you had it it's logically appropriate to
retain it, but suppose you did not have it. There seems to
me to be a fundamental difference between the other
opinions and this one. This one seems to cross the line,
referring back to a set of standards into an analysis point
of view, which was not expressed.
The question then is is that an appropriate
auditor's role? Clarence at that point made a statement
that had some meaning to me that he may not have intended,
he said just because at the moment we have this one red
flag, which may not be perfect but please don't take it
away from us, am I to take it that that means maybe we should
have two red flags or three red flags, and there is a
subtle sort of shading there that really worries me, because
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we retain this and it’s only the first of a whole series of
red flags auditors are moving from, sort of, the auditing
function as we've generally treated it, into an analysis
and reporting assessment function which I think they've
never said they wanted, a claim they don't have, a claim
they aren't providing, and yet I think of well, more than
half of the scenarios over here suggest that they believe
the analysts believe they are providing that function.
MR. SAMPSON: I was merely repeating what
I thought I heard the users say, and not leading towards
anything, but I think you overstate the case as well when
you say auditors have no analysis role at all, because in 
reading evaluations about fair presentation, they're always
looking into the future in some respects, and they have a 
lot of that kind of thing which goes into an audit statement
and financial considerations.
MR. MULLARKEY: But that's a role subsumed
by GAAP as opposed to a separate role not subsumed by GAAP.
MR. KNOWLES: In Canada, anyway, they don't
assume it's a fair presentation and they don't say it's
a fair presentation, they say it's a fair presentation in
accordance with GAAP.
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And in Canada you can't separate those
statements or stop halfway through.
MR. SAMPSON: Nor can you here.
MR. KNOWLES: To me that's a difference of
significance, though, when you're making a point. Fair
presentation, that's the job of the analyst to decide after
if it’s a fair presentation in accordance with GAAP.
It's also a fair presentation to make to
the buyer to recommend a buy or sell.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think there is some
danger that the people sitting around this table have both
the inclination and the patience to discuss this topic in
perpetuity, and we at the Auditing Standards Board certainly
have evidenced that ability at least, so I would guess that
this group isn't much different.
It just happens that the views are perhaps
more divided here, but I think we might miss a significant
opportunity to input the session if we didn't recognize that
we have some people in our audience who are observers that
have observed this discussion from the beginning, particularly
meaning the AICPA staff, some of the other observers that
are here from public accounting firms that traditionally
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observe all of our meetings, and that doesn't preclude any
of you.
The Advisory Council people are here, and
I guess I'd like to ask if any of you back there have any
specific observations, comments or anything that you'd like
to ask any of us or ask us to discuss, perhaps, because,
as I said, I think you’ve witnessed this for a long time and
may have some perceptions that are missing us.
So I'd like to throw it open to the floor
for everyone to have the floor and ask in some orderly
fashion here for comments.
Anybody? Marty?
A SPEAKER: I had one question that I wanted
to ask the bankers, and that is, do they perceive of any
loss of information value when they have to review a set
of financial statements that carry a review report by a
CPA, not an audit report?
The standard of our profession's review
of financial statements does not call for an uncertainty
qualification, so I wanted an assessment of the differences
between the set of audit statements and the review report
statements in that regard.
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MR. GRIMMIG: Right or wrong, I think the
perception — perhaps it's a personal perception — is
that there has been a continuous step back by the accounting
profession from what used to be the unqualified audit
as the be all and end all of the world that bankers wanted
and relied on.
Then we got sold on this review and
compilation, which informed us two or three or four steps
backward, in my opinion, and now we heard this, which I
consider a massive step backwards.
We had the question of reasonableness, which
appeared to me to be a major step backwards, which was
involved or at least is still in the opinion.
To my way of thinking 14,000 banks are
literally here asking you to keep this thing in your
opinion letters, and we are literally begging you to do it 
because we're telling you it’s helpful, and all I hear is "You
mean you think it's helpful, Mr. Banker, we don't think
it's helpful to you, so we’re going to take it out."
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That isn't exactly
it. I think we were far more critical than that.
MR. WATTERSTON: I would say that we don’t
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obviously consider reviews as we would an audit. We don’t
think that the standards associated with review come anywhere
near the standards associated with audit, and it would
obviously, no matter what the disclosures are, call for a
whole lot more work by the banker than if he had gotten an 
opinion, unqualified opinion on an audited report.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Joe, you have observed
this fiasco for the whole year.
A SPEAKER: The thing I find enormously 
troublesome is the flip side of the perception with respect
to the presence of the "Subject To," and that is to say the
negative inference that if there is not a "Subject To" then
there is some type of qualitative affirmation being provided
by the independent auditor that is giving assurance and
comfort to the users.
In terms of the public policy considerations
and in terms of the public interest I'm deeply troubled
that the financial community and nearly all of the constituen­
cies, maybe including the accounting profession — and I’m
sure the legal profession is totally confused on the point —
really do not have the focus and grasp on what is really a 
limited tool, if we were to accept it as an analysis tool.
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There are many other elements of uncertainty
that are just not addressed by the "Subject To" that
are not signaled, that do not have the benefit of the
so-called red flag. And if we accept it as a prioritization
factor it’s dealing with a shallow universe, and if we
don’t change it, it seems to me that at a minimum the
private sector and the public sector really must undertake
a widespread assignment in terms of education, self-education
 
so that we close the gap as to just what this wonderful
animal is and what purpose it serves, and what measure in
fact is the reasonable element of reliance.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: J.T. Ball, do you have
any observations or questions or comments —
MR. J.T. BALL: I’ll pass.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: — that you'd like to
make?
Yes, sir?
MR. PREWOZNIK: Along the lines that Joe
mentioned, to me there is a very basic issue of fairness or
unfairness, if you will, to companies and to the auditors, 
who I think now find themselves in the position -- if I were
an auditor I would have to tell you that on the basis of
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what I see in your literature here I can't tell you when 
I am sure that I know when I should go "Subject To" and
when I shouldn't.
To me that's intolerable, that's unfair to
me as a professional, because it puts me at great peril in 
terms of my responsibility to the public and to my company 
plans in terms of how I make my judgments, and it looks to 
me in some cases as though it's kind of a crap shoot.
It's unfair to those companies because in
my experience companies don't like to receive "Subject To,"
and when you come up with this amorphous body of criteria,
why if we can call it that, say, "Well, we made up our
minds on the basis of this," I don't see that it's fair.
And if it's not fair you're going to have the case — forgive
me if I don't know about it — but you're going to have the
case where the bankers are going to be going through the
process of having the young Harvard business grads going
through the flags, and one that should have had a flag
attached to it doesn't have it, and so there is a lawsuit,
and the question is what are the criteria there as to whether
that should have been flagged or not.
These pieces of literature don’t establish
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the criteria. Maybe the survey we talked about would
give some idea, but you're going to have a Judge do it,
and to me that’s not fair, that’s not good business.
And the outcome needs to be that you either
eliminate this unfair situation, you recognize the fact
that it is unfair and guide it by your own light and your
reliance on Stanford and GAAP, you adopt a different mode
that is not unfair to these auditors and to these companies
or I think you force these auditors into a corner where they
say, "Well, we’re going to have to develop some criteria,
we can't sit here and wait for some Judge to tell us
whether we should or should not have gone here on some
particular uncertainty.”
And then I think when they do that they're 
going to say, "We're dealing with some accounting principles
here, we're trying to put in order the magnitude of uncer­
tainties,” and to me that's a self-revealing truth.
The problem, if there is one, I don't believe
there is — is that somebody seeks an ordination of uncer­
tainties, and to me that's an accounting problem, it's not
an auditing problem and I don't know whether you can get
much beyond that except to say, "Well, if you don't face that
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confrontation between the pure accounting issue and the
auditing issue," then I would say that if I were advising
the auditor I would say, "Modify your FAS 2 to say that,"
as I discussed with Clarence at lunch, "We’ll amend it.
We’ll retain it but we're going to amend it and we're going
to amend it based on a fortiori conclusion that the FAS 5
has told us that everything that's in these financials 
with respect to uncertainty is material, and so we're going 
to amend FAS 2, which says on its face that we're only 
supposed to deal with material elements; whenever there is 
an uncertainty referred to in a financial statement or in 
footnotes we'll go 'Subject To' by simply saying 'Subject
to the uncertainties that are discussed in this financial
statement.'"
MR. CARMICHAEL: Which virtually means every
major company will have "Subject To" opinions.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Practically every company.
In fact, that's how you bring this thing
to a fair resolution. That's what I would see in sum here
as the bottom line of this whole picture.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Staff, Standards Board
Staff, almost all of you are here and you've had to listen
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to this for a long time; do you have any points you think
we should have asked and didn’t?
Can I ask any of the bankers one short
question prompted by Jerry's remarks: Given retention, 
which I'm not willing to admit personally, but given that 
you retain "Subject To," and having been told that
there is a criterion for when that opinion is expressed,
that's at best a little ambiguous and loose, what would
you find as an acceptable criterion for when we would
and wouldn’t give a "Subject To" opinion, or haven't you
thought about that? It may not be very fair.
MR. WATTERSTON: It's probably not a fair
question.
What Jerry said doesn't necessarily in my
mind at least lead you to dropping the "Subject To."
One alternative is to define it a little
tighter or get the FASB to change the standards so you're
not so uncomfortable when you have to make that judgment.
So I think those are your alternatives.
I'd sure be willing to look at a proposal
that would put some greater definition on when you use
the "Subject To."
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MR. KINNEY: If you had Jerry’s alternative
and every time the FAS 5 required footnotes that are
subject to opinion, it's completely redundant with what 
the FAS 5 required, and you say I don't need that because
the footnotes have it, and it's just telling you the same
thing already there, which is the extreme case —
MR. WATTERSTON:Well, that was the extreme
case, that's right, where everybody gets a "Subject To."
MR. PREWOZNIK: Well, it's somewhat of a
middle ground in the sense that if you're looking for flags,
let's not use a six by six flag, let's use an 18 by 18 flag
which picks up all the uncertainty, so we're going to go
through 40 percent more, so the people who are looking
for the flags, you're going to find all the reports that
have uncertainties in the footnotes. Maybe that's all you
want.
MR. LANDSITTEL: But not all major concerns
will have uncertainties in the footnotes. It will be our
standard language.
MR. PREWOZNIK: I didn't mean to say that.
You would refer to uncertainties only if there were uncer­
tainties mentioned in the footnotes.
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Oh, what you’re saying is all the companies?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Right, any major
company essentially has some contingencies, we've acknowledged
that.
MR. PREWOZNIK: So it certainly demonstrates
the unfairness of the present situation.
On what basis are these people picking and
choosing among those uncertainties?
MR. WATTERSTON: But their solution is to
drop it completely rather than —
MR. MULLARKEY: I think our solution is
that we want to adequately describe such disclosures and
eliminate what preceded those standards.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Except that's what
bothers me.
MR. MULLARKEY: If they aren't adequate the
"Subject To" opinion isn't doing it.
MR. WATTERSTON: You know I think Ed talked
about, you know, you look at each of the pieces and, well,
each one may be a little shaky and there may be some
uncertainty about each one, but as a whole it raises a
question maybe as to the going concern here. I think
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one of the things we're paying auditors for is to give
some sort of judgment on the whole statement.
I don't think we want to see them back away
from that.
MR. FAULS: Of course if that's true the
very components of the aggregate cast doubt on the going
concern and you can't have statements because they're 
misleading if they are not pulled into a going concern
articulation.
They just don't fairly present under the
current GAAP requirement.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: If continued existence
was known to not be possible I suspect you'd go that route.
MR. FAULS: For a judgmental, and the
auditor's judgment may not be saying it's the client. If
it isn't he'd better say so.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Joe?
A SPEAKER: There was some discussion about
the possible increased legal exposure of the accountant to
the auditor for not emphasizing an opinion. The Accountants
Services Committee apparently considered FASB 5 in the
development of FAS 1, and they allowed accountants who
169
issued compilation reports not to modify their reports as
long as the inconsistencies or uncertainties, is the
language, and uncertainties is the language which you are
concerned with, are appropriately disclosed in notes
to the financial statements.
I'm wondering, since we have some legal
expertise here, whether the absence of the modification of
the emphasis in a review report has ever caused problems for
an accountant who did not emphasize a matter that was
appropriately disclosed in the footnotes about an uncertainty
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We don't know the answer
to that. We've considered it and asked legal counsel, and
the fact is that we don't have an answer to that question,
one of the reasons being that the more researchable case
law obviously involves public companies, and we're rarely
the recipients of either compilation or review reports,
so it's very difficult — I mean you could speculate, surely,
that yes, that could occur, and you might be right, but I
think it's unfair to ask legal counsel to just do that
because we've asked it and we don't know the answer.
MR. MULLARKEY: Right, it's being researched.
MR. KNOWLES: I'd like to come back to James
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Watterston. He ended up by saying, "What are we paying
the accountant for," and he was talking about perhaps the
aggregate of the points leading up to the going concern
question.
I think the answer is we aren't paying the 
accounting profession. In the particular issue we're
paying the auditors in the circumstances and the bank or the
analyst receives its reward in terms of the term that it make
on its loan or commissions on the sales of securities, so
I think that again that starts to blend the roles as to who
is doing what to whom for what purposes, and it's not the
auditor's job to present such a financial statement that it
can just be rubber-stamped and the bankers or the investment
community can make their interest return or other revenues
on the basis of the auditor's report.
MR. WATTERSTON: I don't mean to imply that
we don't just take what we get here and make a decision.
Obviously a lot of analysis and judgment goes into it, but
it seems to me when an auditor gets all done doing all his
work he better stand back and take a look at all the
statements as a whole, see whether they make sense.
MR.MULLARKEY: Yes, and I think auditors do
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that for more than uncertainties, they do it for the whole
financial presentation.
MR. WATTERSTON: I want them to do it for
the whole thing, not just the uncertainties.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: And by definition I
know they aren’t going to be adjusted by the problem you’re
worrying about.
MR. WATTERSTON: They may not be adjusted
but they could be.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: No, they can't be.
They never will be.
MR. WATTERSTON: They can't be, but I want to
know whether I should in my analysis adjust.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: The problem I have
with that, Jim, is you want me to make that evaluation.
MR. WATTERSTON: I don't want you to tell me
how much to adjust it by, I just want you to tell me that
maybe I ought to think about adjusting them.
A SPEAKER: I'm a member of an ABA committee
and I don't mean to be redundant in terms of comment but I
have been sitting here all day listening to the discussion, 
and it seems very much to me that this last line is really
where we started out.
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The users — and it's really an educational
misperception problem, echoes back to issues that have been
going on for years between auditors and users of financial
statements.
What is the role of the auditor, what is
the function of the financial statements?
The users would like a degree of certainty
beyond that which financial statements present, are intended
to present or that the auditors suggest they present and
there is a perception that I get that the "Subject To" is
a way of at least in the users' minds conveying that little
wink or nod that "There is more here than meets the eye,"
and that's not the case.
The auditors deny that's the case, but the
users say, "In spite of the denial we still want it because
we don't believe you."
As a logical, rational matter it seems to
me that the place to start is to correct the perception of
the user as to what he is getting, and not to try to — I
use a pejorative word — pervert the system to continue to
encourage the user to be misled, and I think that that's the
principal basis that I've heard that the users say that it’s
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useful, because they’re using it based on a misperception 
of what they’ve been told, that they like to be told that,
so they want to continue.
It seems to me that GAAP requires the
financial statement to make adequate disclosure. The
"Subject To" contingency adds nothing to the disclosure
quantitatively or qualitatively, and therefore it is
certainly in logic a redundancy.
I have very little in the way of deep
concern about the user who wishes not to use the financial
statements, not to read the financial statement, not to
understand the financial statement but would like to have
somebody, an auditor for the moment, tell him that there
is something he ought to pay attention to.
That’s really, it seems to me, the user's
responsibility, be it the banker or the analyst or the public 
investor. If he can't do it himself then he has to pay
somebody to do the job who will be able to understand what
he’s being told.
But I don't think that we really advance
the ball by continuing the misperception of what the
financial statements represent.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: In case there is a
shadow of doubt in anyone’s mind, the ABA referred to is
not the American Bankers Association, it's the American Bar
Association.
MR. SAMPSON: There was no doubt.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: All right, I wanted to
clear that up.
Meryl?
MS. REED: I'd like to ask the bankers to
describe what they think it would take on the part of the 
accounting and auditing profession in order for you to be 
satisfied and agree on the elimination of the "Subject To"
opinion, and if you thought it was better disclosure, what
kind of disclosure, percentages or what, reorganization of
the footnotes or what? What recommendations would you give
as the prerequisite for the elimination?
MR.WATTERSTON: I never approached it from
that standpoint, I never thought there was a chance that
this thing would ever pass, so once it gets down the line
and looks like it's going to pass we'll come up with alter­
natives .
MR. KINNEY: We're only guessing as to what
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that might be, because we say, "What would you like to see
highlighted?" And there is no hint from anybody.
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, we like reasonably well
what you have. Maybe you could be a little more specific 
on guidelines when you use this thing, and so on.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Let's presume we aren't
going to use it at all. If we're going to eliminate "Subject 
To," you've said this — I think most people have — implied 
that the disclosure standards are inadequate for your needs
and I think Meryl is only asking in what manner are they
inadequate?
If that's right. Maybe we're putting words
in your mouth.
MR. WATTERSTON: Maybe we should have this
meeting a month from now, when we can focus on that instead
of having us prepared for something different.
MR. J.T. BALL: I think, Jim, that probably
raises the issue of the single contingency footnote, which
I think was also raised when Clarence wrote us and suggested
that we consider that, that Ag Sec consider the matter.
And we did examine the issue of the single
contingency footnote, concluded that it would not help
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anything because in effect all of the footnotes are pointing
to various contingencies, so you either have one footnote
that's an index of all the other footnotes or else you have
a tremendous duplication, and as a matter of fact those
who have considered this matter very carefully have suggested 
to us that the single contingency footnote is not a very good 
idea, consequently the Board decided — the FASB decided
not to pursue further consideration of it.
I would guess what would be needed would
be for management to make the same kind of assessment the
auditor has to and put a going concern qualification in the
footnotes, but that's only a guess.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: You don't want to put
any probabilities on the willingness to do that?
MR. LANDSITTEL: The argument against the
single contingency footnote in my mind runs very parallel
to some of the same arguments as apply — you can't have a
single kind of a contingency opinion. You know, what
contingency are you talking about if you don't have that
footnote? Is there a flip side implication that there is an
unqualified lack of contingency?
There is some of the same frustration with
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the judgment as to when you can set a standard to drive
the single contingency footnotes that I believe is the
judgment of the auditor's role as to when — and the lack.
of clarity of the standards of when you might have a "Subject
To" opinion.
MR. BALL: But I would agree with Ed Green
that an auditor probably looks at a lot of different
contingencies in reaching a conclusion to call attention to 
certain contingencies, and it may not be any one standing
alone, it may be the combination of them that causes that
qualification.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Jack?
A SPEAKER: Yes, since the bankers group
is the only user group, or practically the only one left,
you are the target. Let me ask this: Would you welcome
the Auditing Standards Board expanding standards to establish
flags for other topics to which your attention could be
directed?
MR. GRIMMIG: I sure would.
SPEAKER: What other topics might those be?
MR. GRIMMIG: Well, maybe I’m not— I
don't pretend to be an accountant, I don't pretend to be
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much of a banker, but if there was some way to indicate 
in the footnotes that the quality of the accounts receivable 
were 85 percent collectible, versus 100 percent collectible, 
if the inventory was 50 percent stale and 25 percent brand 
new and salable, if there were some qualifications that
the figures and the numbers in the financial statement,
each item, were plus or minus two percent or 20 percent 
valid on a conservative basis or on a liquidation basis,
this would be the range that would be damned helpful.
You said in the footnotes. Now, would you
also be very happy to see auditors raise flags directing
your attention to such footnotes in the report itself?
In the auditor’s report itself?
MR. GRIMMIG: In the letter, sure.
So all matter of subjects, whether they be
these you just mentioned, whether it’s unusual executive
compensation, unusual accounting treatments, I suppose a
long list, you'd be very happy to see flags?
MR. GRIMMIG: It would be very helpful as
long as it gave me another red flag to look at.
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, I guess I wouldn't
go that far, but I'd like the auditor to tell me where or
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which major adjustments are his in that statement, the
potential adjustments, and of course most of those relate
to what we're talking about today, litigation or going 
concern realization or discontinued operations or something
like that.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Well, what should we rely
upon as a framework for making that evaluation? I mean we
rely upon GAAP and GAAP tells us that there aren't adjustments
to be made, and we would take an exception to our opinion.
We have that framework to do that, apart from the "Subject
To" opinion —
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, you ought to go down
to the FASB and get them to change the standards.
MR. LANDSITTEL: Well, you're implying a
deficiency in the standards, and I guess I don't understand
the specificity.
MR. WATTERSTON: No, the standards stay,
you don't have to make the adjustment at the moment because
you don't have to exactly figure out what it might be.
But there is a potential, you know, of significant adjustment
I don't see the problem of bringing that to the user’s
attention.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think it’s a matter
in some of our concerns, Jim — it’s a matter of degrees, 
perhaps, and we all can think of our given examples, but 
when you say that it implies to us I believe a feeling on 
your part that there is inherently more precision in the 
financial statements apart from contingencies that we 
just inherently know don’t exist, there are probably more
dollars of accounting estimate adjustments that went into
issues that are not highlighted, not even discussed, than
are potentially payable under the litigation in question,
and yet we’re not asking for that.
I think it’s a matter of — I think we’re
concerned that there is an implication of precision that
is presumed, and then we carve out this contingency issue
and make us sort of pseudo-lawyer predictors as to judgments
that in our own mind may not be as significant, although
material, nowhere near as significant as the statements
that went into the statements themselves.
MR. HODGES: it's an entirely fair estimate,
you know, that there are estimates in the life of an asset
and the recovery value of inventory, but there are other
ways to get reasonable handles on these things. Even if
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you're wrong it's probably not going to have a significant
impact on the financial statements or the record earnings
or maybe the net worth for one year, the impact of some
of these major lawsuits, if they were to go against you,
and they may not go against you, and therefore you don't
book anything, you don't give people an average number.
I've never seen anybody booking the worst
case situation. GAAP doesn't call for it. And investors
are on a different side of this, you never anticipate
this tremendous event that happens, you only record it when
it does. All you're doing is telling a guy that this is
significant in trying to understand the numbers before you,
and you only do it in my experience when this is something
that can be very, very material.
A SPEAKER: But again that seems to be rebated
to an issue of GAAP, not an issue of the opinion. You know
if in fact you question whether something should be
booked, again we're dealing with an FASB issue.
MR. HODGES: I'm telling you most investors
are not accountants as such. They read the English language,
they understand it. They don't know the technical rules of
either auditing or accounting, but they are trying to draw
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an impression from something they read. It looks like a 
company with a growing earnings record. And if you by a
footnote don't really force upon them clearly, "Here's
something that's so material or could be so material that
all of these numbers about this nice earnings program are
immaterial” —
A SPEAKER: And yet you could have an
enormous unfunded pension liability that is out of the net.
. A SPEAKER: We need more flags.
That's the job here.
MR. HODGES: We haven't seen a case where
it's all going to come due tomorrow, the Judge is going
to make a decision that comes through tomorrow.
MR. KINNEY: Howard, is this again a small
investor large company difference here, because for the 
public companies traded, the stock prices show the price
of the stock goes down before the report goes out.
These analysts who are talking about finding
this in the auditor's report are going to be days late and
several dollars short in trying to save the plan's money
because the stock is down by the time the report hits the
street.
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Now, for bankers that may be a different
situation because perhaps the first to know is the banker, 
but for public funds the studies show the price is down
well before the auditor’s report comes out, and almost no
reaction later.
And if the analysts were surprised at the
"Subject To" opinion it seems the prices would react
violently when this report hits the street, yet they
don’t. The price declines well before that. So it's not
so much information to the market. It concerns it, perhaps
but —
MR. HODGES: Is that really true of earnings
per share? The report concerns something all along, and
some people get the information late, but better than never.
MR. SAMPSON: It concerns the market price
information. That doesn't mean you shouldn't give it.
MR. MULLARKEY: I want to on behalf of the
Board, particularly the task force that will be able to
review the record and isolate the information that we need
to go on with this project to determine what the appropriate 
course of action is, on behalf of all of those people I 
would like to express our appreciation for coming to the
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meeting and being so candid and open in sharing your 
insights into this issue.
It's an area obviously controversial and 
difficult. We are all trying to reason to the right answer, 
and your insights will help us quite a lot.
I very much appreciate your participating 
in the meeting today.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: One final comment
and I think an especial thanks is necessary because all of
us around the table obviously, with one exception, have a
very real interest in the outcome of this decision — that 
isn't true of your position, coining from Canada, but we 
especially appreciate the effort and the time you have
taken to devote to our project, and I hope you will
feel free to call on us, and if we can reciprocate we
would be most happy to do so.
I do genuinely appreciate your coming,
Mr. Knowles, thank you.
One thing, could we ask the Auditing
Standards Board staff and the members to stay here.
(Whereupon, at 2:45 P.M. the meeting
was adjourned.)
